When a sensitive variable has a complex type, any traversal of the
variable should still result in a sensitive value. This test uses a
sensitive `map(string)` and verifies that both plan and state output
include the appropriate sensitive marks for the resource attribute.
NodePlannableResource and NodeApplyableResource EvalTree()s have been
replaced with Execute() nodes and straight-through code. Both called
EvalWriteResourceState and were the only functions to use it, so I chose
to replace EvalWriteResourceState entirely with straight-through code
(by copying the contents into the two locations).
As we continue iterating towards saving valid hashes for a package in a
depsfile lock file after installation and verifying them on future
installation, this prepares getproviders for the possibility of having
multiple valid hashes per package.
This will arise in future commits for two reasons:
- We will need to support both the legacy "zip hash" hashing scheme and
the new-style content-based hashing scheme because currently the
registry protocol is only able to produce the legacy scheme, but our
other installation sources prefer the content-based scheme. Therefore
packages will typically have a mixture of hashes of both types.
- Installing from an upstream registry will save the hashes for the
packages across all supported platforms, rather than just the current
platform, and we'll consider all of those valid for future installation
if we see both successful matching of the current platform checksum and
a signature verification for the checksums file as a whole.
This also includes some more preparation for the second case above in that
signatureAuthentication now supports AcceptableHashes and returns all of
the zip-based hashes it can find in the checksums file. This is a bit of
an abstraction leak because previously that authenticator considered its
"document" to just be opaque bytes, but we want to make sure that we can
only end up trusting _all_ of the hashes if we've verified that the
document is signed. Hopefully we'll make this better in a future commit
with some refactoring, but that's deferred for now in order to minimize
disruption to existing codepaths while we work towards a provider locking
MVP.
The logic for what constitutes a valid hash and how different hash schemes
are represented was starting to get sprawled over many different files and
packages.
Consistently with other cases where we've used named types to gather the
definition of a particular string into a single place and have the Go
compiler help us use it properly, this introduces both getproviders.Hash
representing a hash value and getproviders.HashScheme representing the
idea of a particular hash scheme.
Most of this changeset is updating existing uses of primitive strings to
uses of getproviders.Hash. The new type definitions are in
internal/getproviders/hash.go.
Although origin registries return specific [filename, hash] pairs, our
various different installation methods can't produce a structured mapping
from platform to hash without breaking changes.
Therefore, as a compromise, we'll continue to do platform-specific checks
against upstream data in the cases where that's possible (installation
from origin registry or network mirror) but we'll treat the lock file as
just a flat set of equally-valid hashes, at least one of which must match
after we've completed whatever checks we've made against the
upstream-provided checksums/signatures.
This includes only the minimal internal/getproviders updates required to
make this compile. A subsequent commit will update that package to
actually support the idea of verifying against multiple hashes.
The "acceptable hashes" for a package is a set of hashes that the upstream
source considers to be good hashes for checking whether future installs
of the same provider version are considered to match this one.
Because the acceptable hashes are a package authentication concern and
they already need to be known (at least in part) to implement the
authenticators, here we add AcceptableHashes as an optional extra method
that an authenticator can implement.
Because these are hashes chosen by the upstream system, the caller must
make its own determination about their trustworthiness. The result of
authentication is likely to be an input to that, for example by
distrusting hashes produced by an authenticator that succeeds but doesn't
report having validated anything.
This is the pre-existing hashing scheme that was initially built for
releases.hashicorp.com and then later reused for the provider registry
protocol, which takes a SHA256 hash of the official distribution .zip file
and formats it as lowercase hex.
This is a non-ideal hash scheme because it works only for
PackageLocalArchive locations, and so we can't verify package directories
on local disk against such hashes. However, the registry protocol is now
a compatibility constraint and so we're going to need to support this
hashing scheme for the foreseeable future.
* Add creation test and simplify in-place test
* Add deletion test
* Start adding marking from state
Start storing paths that should be marked
when pulled out of state. Implements deep
copy for attr paths. This commit also includes some
comment noise from investigations, and fixing the diff test
* Fix apply stripping marks
* Expand diff tests
* Basic apply test
* Update comments on equality checks to clarify current understanding
* Add JSON serialization for sensitive paths
We need to serialize a slice of cty.Path values to be used to re-mark
the sensitive values of a resource instance when loading the state file.
Paths consist of a list of steps, each of which may be either getting an
attribute value by name, or indexing into a collection by string or
number.
To serialize these without building a complex parser for a compact
string form, we render a nested array of small objects, like so:
[
[
{ type: "get_attr", value: "foo" },
{ type: "index", value: { "type": "number", "value": 2 } }
]
]
The above example is equivalent to a path `foo[2]`.
* Format diffs with map types
Comparisons need unmarked values to operate on,
so create unmarked values for those operations. Additionally,
change diff to cover map types
* Remove debugging printing
* Fix bug with marking non-sensitive values
When pulling a sensitive value from state,
we were previously using those marks to remark
the planned new value, but that new value
might *not* be sensitive, so let's not do that
* Fix apply test
Apply was not passing the second state
through to the third pass at apply
* Consistency in checking for length of paths vs inspecting into value
* In apply, don't mark with before paths
* AttrPaths test coverage for DeepCopy
* Revert format changes
Reverts format changes in format/diff for this
branch so those changes can be discussed on a separate PR
* Refactor name of AttrPaths to AttrSensitivePaths
* Rename AttributePaths/attributePaths for naming consistency
Co-authored-by: Alisdair McDiarmid <alisdair@users.noreply.github.com>
In order to save any changes to lifecycle options, we need to record
those changes during refresh, otherwise they would only be updated when
there is a change in the resource to be applied.
Go modules are well understood and supported now, and since our build
pipeline no longer uses the vendored packages, we can remove the extra
overhead of maintaining these files.
This evaluation was required when refresh ran in a separate walk and
managed resources were only partly handled by configuration. Now that we
have the correct dependency information available when refreshing
configured resources, we can update their state accordingly. Since
orphaned resources are not refreshed, they can retain their stored
dependencies for correct ordering.
This also prevents users from introducing cycles with nodes they can't
"see", since only orphaned nodes will retain their stored dependencies,
and the remaining nodes will be updated according to the configuration.
Alisdair McDiarmid