update ssh and crypto deps
This commit is contained in:
James Bardin
parent
780ca17884
commit
2206512e58
2
go.mod
2
go.mod
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@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ require (
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go.uber.org/atomic v1.3.2 // indirect
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go.uber.org/multierr v1.1.0 // indirect
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go.uber.org/zap v1.9.1 // indirect
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190426145343-a29dc8fdc734
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190701094942-4def268fd1a4
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golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190502183928-7f726cade0ab
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golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190220154721-9b3c75971fc9
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google.golang.org/api v0.1.0
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2
go.sum
2
go.sum
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@ -449,6 +449,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2 h1:VklqNMn3ovrHsnt90Pveol
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACkg1iLfiJU5Ep61QUkGW8qpdssI0+w=
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190426145343-a29dc8fdc734 h1:p/H982KKEjUnLJkM3tt/LemDnOc1GiZL5FCVlORJ5zo=
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190426145343-a29dc8fdc734/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI=
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190701094942-4def268fd1a4 h1:HuIa8hRrWRSrqYzx1qI49NNxhdi2PrY7gxVSq1JjLDc=
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golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190701094942-4def268fd1a4/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI=
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golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190121172915-509febef88a4/go.mod h1:CJ0aWSM057203Lf6IL+f9T1iT9GByDxfZKAQTCR3kQA=
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golang.org/x/lint v0.0.0-20180702182130-06c8688daad7/go.mod h1:UVdnD1Gm6xHRNCYTkRU2/jEulfH38KcIWyp/GAMgvoE=
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golang.org/x/lint v0.0.0-20181026193005-c67002cb31c3/go.mod h1:UVdnD1Gm6xHRNCYTkRU2/jEulfH38KcIWyp/GAMgvoE=
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@ -2,6 +2,11 @@
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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// In Go 1.13, the ed25519 package was promoted to the standard library as
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// crypto/ed25519, and this package became a wrapper for the standard library one.
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//
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// +build !go1.13
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// Package ed25519 implements the Ed25519 signature algorithm. See
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// https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/.
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//
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@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
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// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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// +build go1.13
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// Package ed25519 implements the Ed25519 signature algorithm. See
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// https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/.
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//
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// These functions are also compatible with the “Ed25519” function defined in
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// RFC 8032. However, unlike RFC 8032's formulation, this package's private key
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// representation includes a public key suffix to make multiple signing
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// operations with the same key more efficient. This package refers to the RFC
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// 8032 private key as the “seed”.
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//
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// Beginning with Go 1.13, the functionality of this package was moved to the
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// standard library as crypto/ed25519. This package only acts as a compatibility
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// wrapper.
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package ed25519
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import (
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"io"
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)
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const (
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// PublicKeySize is the size, in bytes, of public keys as used in this package.
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PublicKeySize = 32
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// PrivateKeySize is the size, in bytes, of private keys as used in this package.
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PrivateKeySize = 64
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// SignatureSize is the size, in bytes, of signatures generated and verified by this package.
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SignatureSize = 64
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// SeedSize is the size, in bytes, of private key seeds. These are the private key representations used by RFC 8032.
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SeedSize = 32
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)
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// PublicKey is the type of Ed25519 public keys.
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//
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// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PublicKey type.
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// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type.
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type PublicKey = ed25519.PublicKey
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// PrivateKey is the type of Ed25519 private keys. It implements crypto.Signer.
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//
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// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PrivateKey type.
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// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type.
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type PrivateKey = ed25519.PrivateKey
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// GenerateKey generates a public/private key pair using entropy from rand.
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// If rand is nil, crypto/rand.Reader will be used.
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func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (PublicKey, PrivateKey, error) {
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return ed25519.GenerateKey(rand)
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}
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// NewKeyFromSeed calculates a private key from a seed. It will panic if
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// len(seed) is not SeedSize. This function is provided for interoperability
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// with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds in this
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// package.
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func NewKeyFromSeed(seed []byte) PrivateKey {
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return ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed)
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}
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// Sign signs the message with privateKey and returns a signature. It will
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// panic if len(privateKey) is not PrivateKeySize.
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func Sign(privateKey PrivateKey, message []byte) []byte {
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return ed25519.Sign(privateKey, message)
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}
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// Verify reports whether sig is a valid signature of message by publicKey. It
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// will panic if len(publicKey) is not PublicKeySize.
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func Verify(publicKey PublicKey, message, sig []byte) bool {
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return ed25519.Verify(publicKey, message, sig)
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,668 @@
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// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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// Based on CRYPTOGAMS code with the following comment:
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// # ====================================================================
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// # Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL
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// # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and
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// # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further
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// # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/.
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// # ====================================================================
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// Original code can be found at the link below:
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// https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/commit/a60f5b50ed908e91e5c39ca79126a4a876d5d8ff
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// There are some differences between CRYPTOGAMS code and this one. The round
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// loop for "_int" isn't the same as the original. Some adjustments were
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// necessary because there are less vector registers available. For example, some
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// X variables (r12, r13, r14, and r15) share the same register used by the
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// counter. The original code uses ctr to name the counter. Here we use CNT
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// because golang uses CTR as the counter register name.
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// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine
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#include "textflag.h"
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#define OUT R3
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#define INP R4
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#define LEN R5
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#define KEY R6
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#define CNT R7
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#define TEMP R8
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#define X0 R11
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#define X1 R12
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#define X2 R14
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#define X3 R15
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#define X4 R16
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#define X5 R17
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#define X6 R18
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#define X7 R19
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#define X8 R20
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#define X9 R21
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#define X10 R22
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#define X11 R23
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#define X12 R24
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#define X13 R25
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#define X14 R26
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#define X15 R27
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#define CON0 X0
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#define CON1 X1
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#define CON2 X2
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#define CON3 X3
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#define KEY0 X4
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#define KEY1 X5
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#define KEY2 X6
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#define KEY3 X7
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#define KEY4 X8
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#define KEY5 X9
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#define KEY6 X10
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#define KEY7 X11
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#define CNT0 X12
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#define CNT1 X13
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#define CNT2 X14
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#define CNT3 X15
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#define TMP0 R9
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#define TMP1 R10
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#define TMP2 R28
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#define TMP3 R29
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#define CONSTS R8
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#define A0 V0
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#define B0 V1
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#define C0 V2
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#define D0 V3
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#define A1 V4
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#define B1 V5
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#define C1 V6
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#define D1 V7
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#define A2 V8
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#define B2 V9
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#define C2 V10
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#define D2 V11
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#define T0 V12
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#define T1 V13
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#define T2 V14
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#define K0 V15
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#define K1 V16
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#define K2 V17
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#define K3 V18
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#define K4 V19
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#define K5 V20
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#define FOUR V21
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#define SIXTEEN V22
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#define TWENTY4 V23
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#define TWENTY V24
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#define TWELVE V25
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#define TWENTY5 V26
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#define SEVEN V27
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#define INPPERM V28
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#define OUTPERM V29
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#define OUTMASK V30
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#define DD0 V31
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#define DD1 SEVEN
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#define DD2 T0
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#define DD3 T1
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#define DD4 T2
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DATA ·consts+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3320646e61707865
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DATA ·consts+0x08(SB)/8, $0x6b20657479622d32
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DATA ·consts+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000001
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DATA ·consts+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
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DATA ·consts+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000004
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DATA ·consts+0x28(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
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DATA ·consts+0x30(SB)/8, $0x0a0b08090e0f0c0d
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DATA ·consts+0x38(SB)/8, $0x0203000106070405
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DATA ·consts+0x40(SB)/8, $0x090a0b080d0e0f0c
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DATA ·consts+0x48(SB)/8, $0x0102030005060704
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GLOBL ·consts(SB), RODATA, $80
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//func chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[32]byte, counter *[16]byte)
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TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(SB),NOSPLIT|NOFRAME,$0
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// Load the arguments inside the registers
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MOVD out+0(FP), OUT
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MOVD inp+8(FP), INP
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MOVD len+16(FP), LEN
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MOVD key+24(FP), KEY
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MOVD counter+32(FP), CNT
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MOVD $·consts(SB), CONSTS // point to consts addr
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MOVD $16, X0
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MOVD $32, X1
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MOVD $48, X2
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MOVD $64, X3
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MOVD $31, X4
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MOVD $15, X5
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// Load key
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LVX (KEY)(R0), K1
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LVSR (KEY)(R0), T0
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LVX (KEY)(X0), K2
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LVX (KEY)(X4), DD0
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// Load counter
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LVX (CNT)(R0), K3
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LVSR (CNT)(R0), T1
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LVX (CNT)(X5), DD1
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// Load constants
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LVX (CONSTS)(R0), K0
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LVX (CONSTS)(X0), K5
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LVX (CONSTS)(X1), FOUR
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LVX (CONSTS)(X2), SIXTEEN
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LVX (CONSTS)(X3), TWENTY4
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// Align key and counter
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VPERM K2, K1, T0, K1
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VPERM DD0, K2, T0, K2
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VPERM DD1, K3, T1, K3
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// Load counter to GPR
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MOVWZ 0(CNT), CNT0
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MOVWZ 4(CNT), CNT1
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MOVWZ 8(CNT), CNT2
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MOVWZ 12(CNT), CNT3
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// Adjust vectors for the initial state
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VADDUWM K3, K5, K3
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VADDUWM K3, K5, K4
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VADDUWM K4, K5, K5
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// Synthesized constants
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VSPLTISW $-12, TWENTY
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VSPLTISW $12, TWELVE
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VSPLTISW $-7, TWENTY5
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VXOR T0, T0, T0
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VSPLTISW $-1, OUTMASK
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LVSR (INP)(R0), INPPERM
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LVSL (OUT)(R0), OUTPERM
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VPERM OUTMASK, T0, OUTPERM, OUTMASK
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loop_outer_vmx:
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// Load constant
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MOVD $0x61707865, CON0
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MOVD $0x3320646e, CON1
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MOVD $0x79622d32, CON2
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MOVD $0x6b206574, CON3
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VOR K0, K0, A0
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VOR K0, K0, A1
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VOR K0, K0, A2
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VOR K1, K1, B0
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MOVD $10, TEMP
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// Load key to GPR
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MOVWZ 0(KEY), X4
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MOVWZ 4(KEY), X5
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MOVWZ 8(KEY), X6
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MOVWZ 12(KEY), X7
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VOR K1, K1, B1
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VOR K1, K1, B2
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MOVWZ 16(KEY), X8
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MOVWZ 0(CNT), X12
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MOVWZ 20(KEY), X9
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MOVWZ 4(CNT), X13
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VOR K2, K2, C0
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VOR K2, K2, C1
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MOVWZ 24(KEY), X10
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MOVWZ 8(CNT), X14
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VOR K2, K2, C2
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VOR K3, K3, D0
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MOVWZ 28(KEY), X11
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MOVWZ 12(CNT), X15
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VOR K4, K4, D1
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VOR K5, K5, D2
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MOVD X4, TMP0
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MOVD X5, TMP1
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MOVD X6, TMP2
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MOVD X7, TMP3
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VSPLTISW $7, SEVEN
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MOVD TEMP, CTR
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loop_vmx:
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// CRYPTOGAMS uses a macro to create a loop using perl. This isn't possible
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// using assembly macros. Therefore, the macro expansion result was used
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// in order to maintain the algorithm efficiency.
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// This loop generates three keystream blocks using VMX instructions and,
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// in parallel, one keystream block using scalar instructions.
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ADD X4, X0, X0
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ADD X5, X1, X1
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VADDUWM A0, B0, A0
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VADDUWM A1, B1, A1
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ADD X6, X2, X2
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ADD X7, X3, X3
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VADDUWM A2, B2, A2
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VXOR D0, A0, D0
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XOR X0, X12, X12
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XOR X1, X13, X13
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VXOR D1, A1, D1
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VXOR D2, A2, D2
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XOR X2, X14, X14
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XOR X3, X15, X15
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VPERM D0, D0, SIXTEEN, D0
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VPERM D1, D1, SIXTEEN, D1
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ROTLW $16, X12, X12
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ROTLW $16, X13, X13
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VPERM D2, D2, SIXTEEN, D2
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VADDUWM C0, D0, C0
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ROTLW $16, X14, X14
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ROTLW $16, X15, X15
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VADDUWM C1, D1, C1
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VADDUWM C2, D2, C2
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ADD X12, X8, X8
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ADD X13, X9, X9
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VXOR B0, C0, T0
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VXOR B1, C1, T1
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ADD X14, X10, X10
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ADD X15, X11, X11
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VXOR B2, C2, T2
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VRLW T0, TWELVE, B0
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XOR X8, X4, X4
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XOR X9, X5, X5
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VRLW T1, TWELVE, B1
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VRLW T2, TWELVE, B2
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XOR X10, X6, X6
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XOR X11, X7, X7
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VADDUWM A0, B0, A0
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VADDUWM A1, B1, A1
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ROTLW $12, X4, X4
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ROTLW $12, X5, X5
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VADDUWM A2, B2, A2
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VXOR D0, A0, D0
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ROTLW $12, X6, X6
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ROTLW $12, X7, X7
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VXOR D1, A1, D1
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VXOR D2, A2, D2
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ADD X4, X0, X0
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ADD X5, X1, X1
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VPERM D0, D0, TWENTY4, D0
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VPERM D1, D1, TWENTY4, D1
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ADD X6, X2, X2
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ADD X7, X3, X3
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VPERM D2, D2, TWENTY4, D2
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VADDUWM C0, D0, C0
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XOR X0, X12, X12
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XOR X1, X13, X13
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VADDUWM C1, D1, C1
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VADDUWM C2, D2, C2
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XOR X2, X14, X14
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XOR X3, X15, X15
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VXOR B0, C0, T0
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VXOR B1, C1, T1
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ROTLW $8, X12, X12
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ROTLW $8, X13, X13
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VXOR B2, C2, T2
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VRLW T0, SEVEN, B0
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ROTLW $8, X14, X14
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ROTLW $8, X15, X15
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VRLW T1, SEVEN, B1
|
||||
VRLW T2, SEVEN, B2
|
||||
ADD X12, X8, X8
|
||||
ADD X13, X9, X9
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C0, C0, C0
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C1, C1, C1
|
||||
ADD X14, X10, X10
|
||||
ADD X15, X11, X11
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C2, C2, C2
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, B0, B0, B0
|
||||
XOR X8, X4, X4
|
||||
XOR X9, X5, X5
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, B1, B1, B1
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, B2, B2, B2
|
||||
XOR X10, X6, X6
|
||||
XOR X11, X7, X7
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, D0, D0, D0
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, D1, D1, D1
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X4, X4
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X5, X5
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, D2, D2, D2
|
||||
VADDUWM A0, B0, A0
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X6, X6
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X7, X7
|
||||
VADDUWM A1, B1, A1
|
||||
VADDUWM A2, B2, A2
|
||||
ADD X5, X0, X0
|
||||
ADD X6, X1, X1
|
||||
VXOR D0, A0, D0
|
||||
VXOR D1, A1, D1
|
||||
ADD X7, X2, X2
|
||||
ADD X4, X3, X3
|
||||
VXOR D2, A2, D2
|
||||
VPERM D0, D0, SIXTEEN, D0
|
||||
XOR X0, X15, X15
|
||||
XOR X1, X12, X12
|
||||
VPERM D1, D1, SIXTEEN, D1
|
||||
VPERM D2, D2, SIXTEEN, D2
|
||||
XOR X2, X13, X13
|
||||
XOR X3, X14, X14
|
||||
VADDUWM C0, D0, C0
|
||||
VADDUWM C1, D1, C1
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X15, X15
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X12, X12
|
||||
VADDUWM C2, D2, C2
|
||||
VXOR B0, C0, T0
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X13, X13
|
||||
ROTLW $16, X14, X14
|
||||
VXOR B1, C1, T1
|
||||
VXOR B2, C2, T2
|
||||
ADD X15, X10, X10
|
||||
ADD X12, X11, X11
|
||||
VRLW T0, TWELVE, B0
|
||||
VRLW T1, TWELVE, B1
|
||||
ADD X13, X8, X8
|
||||
ADD X14, X9, X9
|
||||
VRLW T2, TWELVE, B2
|
||||
VADDUWM A0, B0, A0
|
||||
XOR X10, X5, X5
|
||||
XOR X11, X6, X6
|
||||
VADDUWM A1, B1, A1
|
||||
VADDUWM A2, B2, A2
|
||||
XOR X8, X7, X7
|
||||
XOR X9, X4, X4
|
||||
VXOR D0, A0, D0
|
||||
VXOR D1, A1, D1
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X5, X5
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X6, X6
|
||||
VXOR D2, A2, D2
|
||||
VPERM D0, D0, TWENTY4, D0
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X7, X7
|
||||
ROTLW $12, X4, X4
|
||||
VPERM D1, D1, TWENTY4, D1
|
||||
VPERM D2, D2, TWENTY4, D2
|
||||
ADD X5, X0, X0
|
||||
ADD X6, X1, X1
|
||||
VADDUWM C0, D0, C0
|
||||
VADDUWM C1, D1, C1
|
||||
ADD X7, X2, X2
|
||||
ADD X4, X3, X3
|
||||
VADDUWM C2, D2, C2
|
||||
VXOR B0, C0, T0
|
||||
XOR X0, X15, X15
|
||||
XOR X1, X12, X12
|
||||
VXOR B1, C1, T1
|
||||
VXOR B2, C2, T2
|
||||
XOR X2, X13, X13
|
||||
XOR X3, X14, X14
|
||||
VRLW T0, SEVEN, B0
|
||||
VRLW T1, SEVEN, B1
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X15, X15
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X12, X12
|
||||
VRLW T2, SEVEN, B2
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C0, C0, C0
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X13, X13
|
||||
ROTLW $8, X14, X14
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C1, C1, C1
|
||||
VSLDOI $8, C2, C2, C2
|
||||
ADD X15, X10, X10
|
||||
ADD X12, X11, X11
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, B0, B0, B0
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, B1, B1, B1
|
||||
ADD X13, X8, X8
|
||||
ADD X14, X9, X9
|
||||
VSLDOI $4, B2, B2, B2
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, D0, D0, D0
|
||||
XOR X10, X5, X5
|
||||
XOR X11, X6, X6
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, D1, D1, D1
|
||||
VSLDOI $12, D2, D2, D2
|
||||
XOR X8, X7, X7
|
||||
XOR X9, X4, X4
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X5, X5
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X6, X6
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X7, X7
|
||||
ROTLW $7, X4, X4
|
||||
BC 0x10, 0, loop_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
SUB $256, LEN, LEN
|
||||
|
||||
// Accumulate key block
|
||||
ADD $0x61707865, X0, X0
|
||||
ADD $0x3320646e, X1, X1
|
||||
ADD $0x79622d32, X2, X2
|
||||
ADD $0x6b206574, X3, X3
|
||||
ADD TMP0, X4, X4
|
||||
ADD TMP1, X5, X5
|
||||
ADD TMP2, X6, X6
|
||||
ADD TMP3, X7, X7
|
||||
MOVWZ 16(KEY), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 20(KEY), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 24(KEY), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 28(KEY), TMP3
|
||||
ADD TMP0, X8, X8
|
||||
ADD TMP1, X9, X9
|
||||
ADD TMP2, X10, X10
|
||||
ADD TMP3, X11, X11
|
||||
|
||||
MOVWZ 12(CNT), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 8(CNT), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 4(CNT), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 0(CNT), TEMP
|
||||
ADD TMP0, X15, X15
|
||||
ADD TMP1, X14, X14
|
||||
ADD TMP2, X13, X13
|
||||
ADD TEMP, X12, X12
|
||||
|
||||
// Accumulate key block
|
||||
VADDUWM A0, K0, A0
|
||||
VADDUWM A1, K0, A1
|
||||
VADDUWM A2, K0, A2
|
||||
VADDUWM B0, K1, B0
|
||||
VADDUWM B1, K1, B1
|
||||
VADDUWM B2, K1, B2
|
||||
VADDUWM C0, K2, C0
|
||||
VADDUWM C1, K2, C1
|
||||
VADDUWM C2, K2, C2
|
||||
VADDUWM D0, K3, D0
|
||||
VADDUWM D1, K4, D1
|
||||
VADDUWM D2, K5, D2
|
||||
|
||||
// Increment counter
|
||||
ADD $4, TEMP, TEMP
|
||||
MOVW TEMP, 0(CNT)
|
||||
|
||||
VADDUWM K3, FOUR, K3
|
||||
VADDUWM K4, FOUR, K4
|
||||
VADDUWM K5, FOUR, K5
|
||||
|
||||
// XOR the input slice (INP) with the keystream, which is stored in GPRs (X0-X3).
|
||||
|
||||
// Load input (aligned or not)
|
||||
MOVWZ 0(INP), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 4(INP), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 8(INP), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 12(INP), TMP3
|
||||
|
||||
// XOR with input
|
||||
XOR TMP0, X0, X0
|
||||
XOR TMP1, X1, X1
|
||||
XOR TMP2, X2, X2
|
||||
XOR TMP3, X3, X3
|
||||
MOVWZ 16(INP), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 20(INP), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 24(INP), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 28(INP), TMP3
|
||||
XOR TMP0, X4, X4
|
||||
XOR TMP1, X5, X5
|
||||
XOR TMP2, X6, X6
|
||||
XOR TMP3, X7, X7
|
||||
MOVWZ 32(INP), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 36(INP), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 40(INP), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 44(INP), TMP3
|
||||
XOR TMP0, X8, X8
|
||||
XOR TMP1, X9, X9
|
||||
XOR TMP2, X10, X10
|
||||
XOR TMP3, X11, X11
|
||||
MOVWZ 48(INP), TMP0
|
||||
MOVWZ 52(INP), TMP1
|
||||
MOVWZ 56(INP), TMP2
|
||||
MOVWZ 60(INP), TMP3
|
||||
XOR TMP0, X12, X12
|
||||
XOR TMP1, X13, X13
|
||||
XOR TMP2, X14, X14
|
||||
XOR TMP3, X15, X15
|
||||
|
||||
// Store output (aligned or not)
|
||||
MOVW X0, 0(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X1, 4(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X2, 8(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X3, 12(OUT)
|
||||
|
||||
ADD $64, INP, INP // INP points to the end of the slice for the alignment code below
|
||||
|
||||
MOVW X4, 16(OUT)
|
||||
MOVD $16, TMP0
|
||||
MOVW X5, 20(OUT)
|
||||
MOVD $32, TMP1
|
||||
MOVW X6, 24(OUT)
|
||||
MOVD $48, TMP2
|
||||
MOVW X7, 28(OUT)
|
||||
MOVD $64, TMP3
|
||||
MOVW X8, 32(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X9, 36(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X10, 40(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X11, 44(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X12, 48(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X13, 52(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X14, 56(OUT)
|
||||
MOVW X15, 60(OUT)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT, OUT
|
||||
|
||||
// Load input
|
||||
LVX (INP)(R0), DD0
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP0), DD1
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP1), DD2
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP2), DD3
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP3), DD4
|
||||
ADD $64, INP, INP
|
||||
|
||||
VPERM DD1, DD0, INPPERM, DD0 // Align input
|
||||
VPERM DD2, DD1, INPPERM, DD1
|
||||
VPERM DD3, DD2, INPPERM, DD2
|
||||
VPERM DD4, DD3, INPPERM, DD3
|
||||
VXOR A0, DD0, A0 // XOR with input
|
||||
VXOR B0, DD1, B0
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP0), DD1 // Keep loading input
|
||||
VXOR C0, DD2, C0
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP1), DD2
|
||||
VXOR D0, DD3, D0
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP2), DD3
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP3), DD0
|
||||
ADD $64, INP, INP
|
||||
MOVD $63, TMP3 // 63 is not a typo
|
||||
VPERM A0, A0, OUTPERM, A0
|
||||
VPERM B0, B0, OUTPERM, B0
|
||||
VPERM C0, C0, OUTPERM, C0
|
||||
VPERM D0, D0, OUTPERM, D0
|
||||
|
||||
VPERM DD1, DD4, INPPERM, DD4 // Align input
|
||||
VPERM DD2, DD1, INPPERM, DD1
|
||||
VPERM DD3, DD2, INPPERM, DD2
|
||||
VPERM DD0, DD3, INPPERM, DD3
|
||||
VXOR A1, DD4, A1
|
||||
VXOR B1, DD1, B1
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP0), DD1 // Keep loading
|
||||
VXOR C1, DD2, C1
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP1), DD2
|
||||
VXOR D1, DD3, D1
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP2), DD3
|
||||
|
||||
// Note that the LVX address is always rounded down to the nearest 16-byte
|
||||
// boundary, and that it always points to at most 15 bytes beyond the end of
|
||||
// the slice, so we cannot cross a page boundary.
|
||||
LVX (INP)(TMP3), DD4 // Redundant in aligned case.
|
||||
ADD $64, INP, INP
|
||||
VPERM A1, A1, OUTPERM, A1 // Pre-misalign output
|
||||
VPERM B1, B1, OUTPERM, B1
|
||||
VPERM C1, C1, OUTPERM, C1
|
||||
VPERM D1, D1, OUTPERM, D1
|
||||
|
||||
VPERM DD1, DD0, INPPERM, DD0 // Align Input
|
||||
VPERM DD2, DD1, INPPERM, DD1
|
||||
VPERM DD3, DD2, INPPERM, DD2
|
||||
VPERM DD4, DD3, INPPERM, DD3
|
||||
VXOR A2, DD0, A2
|
||||
VXOR B2, DD1, B2
|
||||
VXOR C2, DD2, C2
|
||||
VXOR D2, DD3, D2
|
||||
VPERM A2, A2, OUTPERM, A2
|
||||
VPERM B2, B2, OUTPERM, B2
|
||||
VPERM C2, C2, OUTPERM, C2
|
||||
VPERM D2, D2, OUTPERM, D2
|
||||
|
||||
ANDCC $15, OUT, X1 // Is out aligned?
|
||||
MOVD OUT, X0
|
||||
|
||||
VSEL A0, B0, OUTMASK, DD0 // Collect pre-misaligned output
|
||||
VSEL B0, C0, OUTMASK, DD1
|
||||
VSEL C0, D0, OUTMASK, DD2
|
||||
VSEL D0, A1, OUTMASK, DD3
|
||||
VSEL A1, B1, OUTMASK, B0
|
||||
VSEL B1, C1, OUTMASK, C0
|
||||
VSEL C1, D1, OUTMASK, D0
|
||||
VSEL D1, A2, OUTMASK, A1
|
||||
VSEL A2, B2, OUTMASK, B1
|
||||
VSEL B2, C2, OUTMASK, C1
|
||||
VSEL C2, D2, OUTMASK, D1
|
||||
|
||||
STVX DD0, (OUT+TMP0)
|
||||
STVX DD1, (OUT+TMP1)
|
||||
STVX DD2, (OUT+TMP2)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT, OUT
|
||||
STVX DD3, (OUT+R0)
|
||||
STVX B0, (OUT+TMP0)
|
||||
STVX C0, (OUT+TMP1)
|
||||
STVX D0, (OUT+TMP2)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT, OUT
|
||||
STVX A1, (OUT+R0)
|
||||
STVX B1, (OUT+TMP0)
|
||||
STVX C1, (OUT+TMP1)
|
||||
STVX D1, (OUT+TMP2)
|
||||
ADD $64, OUT, OUT
|
||||
|
||||
BEQ aligned_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
SUB X1, OUT, X2 // in misaligned case edges
|
||||
MOVD $0, X3 // are written byte-by-byte
|
||||
|
||||
unaligned_tail_vmx:
|
||||
STVEBX D2, (X2+X3)
|
||||
ADD $1, X3, X3
|
||||
CMPW X3, X1
|
||||
BNE unaligned_tail_vmx
|
||||
SUB X1, X0, X2
|
||||
|
||||
unaligned_head_vmx:
|
||||
STVEBX A0, (X2+X1)
|
||||
CMPW X1, $15
|
||||
ADD $1, X1, X1
|
||||
BNE unaligned_head_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
CMPU LEN, $255 // done with 256-byte block yet?
|
||||
BGT loop_outer_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
JMP done_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
aligned_vmx:
|
||||
STVX A0, (X0+R0)
|
||||
CMPU LEN, $255 // done with 256-byte block yet?
|
||||
BGT loop_outer_vmx
|
||||
|
||||
done_vmx:
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
|||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build !arm64,!s390x arm64,!go1.11 gccgo appengine
|
||||
// +build !ppc64le,!arm64,!s390x arm64,!go1.11 gccgo appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package chacha20
|
||||
|
||||
import "encoding/binary"
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
bufSize = 256
|
||||
haveAsm = true
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32)
|
||||
|
||||
func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) {
|
||||
if len(src) >= bufSize {
|
||||
chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(&dst[0], &src[0], len(src)-len(src)%bufSize, &c.key, &c.counter)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(src)%bufSize != 0 {
|
||||
chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(&c.buf[0], &c.buf[0], bufSize, &c.key, &c.counter)
|
||||
start := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
|
||||
ts, td, tb := src[start:], dst[start:], c.buf[:]
|
||||
// Unroll loop to XOR 32 bytes per iteration.
|
||||
for i := 0; i < len(ts)-32; i += 32 {
|
||||
td, tb = td[:len(ts)], tb[:len(ts)] // bounds check elimination
|
||||
s0 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[0:8])
|
||||
s1 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[8:16])
|
||||
s2 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[16:24])
|
||||
s3 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[24:32])
|
||||
b0 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[0:8])
|
||||
b1 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[8:16])
|
||||
b2 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[16:24])
|
||||
b3 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[24:32])
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[0:8], s0^b0)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[8:16], s1^b1)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[16:24], s2^b2)
|
||||
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[24:32], s3^b3)
|
||||
ts, td, tb = ts[32:], td[32:], tb[32:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
td, tb = td[:len(ts)], tb[:len(ts)] // bounds check elimination
|
||||
for i, v := range ts {
|
||||
td[i] = tb[i] ^ v
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.len = bufSize - (len(src) % bufSize)
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ const defaultRSAKeyBits = 2048
|
|||
// which may be empty but must not contain any of "()<>\x00".
|
||||
// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
|
||||
func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, error) {
|
||||
currentTime := config.Now()
|
||||
creationTime := config.Now()
|
||||
|
||||
bits := defaultRSAKeyBits
|
||||
if config != nil && config.RSABits != 0 {
|
||||
|
|
@ -525,8 +525,8 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
e := &Entity{
|
||||
PrimaryKey: packet.NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &signingPriv.PublicKey),
|
||||
PrivateKey: packet.NewRSAPrivateKey(currentTime, signingPriv),
|
||||
PrimaryKey: packet.NewRSAPublicKey(creationTime, &signingPriv.PublicKey),
|
||||
PrivateKey: packet.NewRSAPrivateKey(creationTime, signingPriv),
|
||||
Identities: make(map[string]*Identity),
|
||||
}
|
||||
isPrimaryId := true
|
||||
|
|
@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
|
|||
Name: uid.Id,
|
||||
UserId: uid,
|
||||
SelfSignature: &packet.Signature{
|
||||
CreationTime: currentTime,
|
||||
CreationTime: creationTime,
|
||||
SigType: packet.SigTypePositiveCert,
|
||||
PubKeyAlgo: packet.PubKeyAlgoRSA,
|
||||
Hash: config.Hash(),
|
||||
|
|
@ -563,10 +563,10 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
|
|||
|
||||
e.Subkeys = make([]Subkey, 1)
|
||||
e.Subkeys[0] = Subkey{
|
||||
PublicKey: packet.NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &encryptingPriv.PublicKey),
|
||||
PrivateKey: packet.NewRSAPrivateKey(currentTime, encryptingPriv),
|
||||
PublicKey: packet.NewRSAPublicKey(creationTime, &encryptingPriv.PublicKey),
|
||||
PrivateKey: packet.NewRSAPrivateKey(creationTime, encryptingPriv),
|
||||
Sig: &packet.Signature{
|
||||
CreationTime: currentTime,
|
||||
CreationTime: creationTime,
|
||||
SigType: packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding,
|
||||
PubKeyAlgo: packet.PubKeyAlgoRSA,
|
||||
Hash: config.Hash(),
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -36,49 +36,49 @@ type PrivateKey struct {
|
|||
iv []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewRSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *rsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
|
||||
func NewRSAPrivateKey(creationTime time.Time, priv *rsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
|
||||
pk := new(PrivateKey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(creationTime, &priv.PublicKey)
|
||||
pk.PrivateKey = priv
|
||||
return pk
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewDSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *dsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
|
||||
func NewDSAPrivateKey(creationTime time.Time, priv *dsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
|
||||
pk := new(PrivateKey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewDSAPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewDSAPublicKey(creationTime, &priv.PublicKey)
|
||||
pk.PrivateKey = priv
|
||||
return pk
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewElGamalPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *elgamal.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
|
||||
func NewElGamalPrivateKey(creationTime time.Time, priv *elgamal.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
|
||||
pk := new(PrivateKey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewElGamalPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewElGamalPublicKey(creationTime, &priv.PublicKey)
|
||||
pk.PrivateKey = priv
|
||||
return pk
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func NewECDSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
|
||||
func NewECDSAPrivateKey(creationTime time.Time, priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateKey {
|
||||
pk := new(PrivateKey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, &priv.PublicKey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(creationTime, &priv.PublicKey)
|
||||
pk.PrivateKey = priv
|
||||
return pk
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// NewSignerPrivateKey creates a PrivateKey from a crypto.Signer that
|
||||
// implements RSA or ECDSA.
|
||||
func NewSignerPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, signer crypto.Signer) *PrivateKey {
|
||||
func NewSignerPrivateKey(creationTime time.Time, signer crypto.Signer) *PrivateKey {
|
||||
pk := new(PrivateKey)
|
||||
// In general, the public Keys should be used as pointers. We still
|
||||
// type-switch on the values, for backwards-compatibility.
|
||||
switch pubkey := signer.Public().(type) {
|
||||
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, pubkey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(creationTime, pubkey)
|
||||
case rsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &pubkey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(creationTime, &pubkey)
|
||||
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, pubkey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(creationTime, pubkey)
|
||||
case ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, &pubkey)
|
||||
pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(creationTime, &pubkey)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
panic("openpgp: unknown crypto.Signer type in NewSignerPrivateKey")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
|||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build !amd64 gccgo appengine
|
||||
// +build !amd64,!ppc64le gccgo appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
|||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build s390x,!go1.11 !arm,!amd64,!s390x gccgo appengine nacl
|
||||
// +build s390x,!go1.11 !arm,!amd64,!s390x,!ppc64le gccgo appengine nacl
|
||||
|
||||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
package poly1305
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
|
||||
|
||||
//go:noescape
|
||||
func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
|
||||
|
||||
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
|
||||
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
|
||||
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
|
||||
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
|
||||
h := newMAC(key)
|
||||
h.Write(m)
|
||||
h.Sum(out)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) {
|
||||
initialize(&h.state, key)
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type mac struct {
|
||||
state [7]uint64 // := uint64{ h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, pad0, pad1 }
|
||||
|
||||
buffer [TagSize]byte
|
||||
offset int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
|
||||
n = len(p)
|
||||
if h.offset > 0 {
|
||||
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
|
||||
if n < remaining {
|
||||
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
|
||||
return n, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
|
||||
p = p[remaining:]
|
||||
h.offset = 0
|
||||
update(&h.state, h.buffer[:])
|
||||
}
|
||||
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
|
||||
update(&h.state, p[:nn])
|
||||
p = p[nn:]
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(p) > 0 {
|
||||
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return n, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
|
||||
state := h.state
|
||||
if h.offset > 0 {
|
||||
update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset])
|
||||
}
|
||||
finalize(out, &state)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine
|
||||
|
||||
#include "textflag.h"
|
||||
|
||||
// This was ported from the amd64 implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2, t0, t1, t2) \
|
||||
MOVD (msg), t0; \
|
||||
MOVD 8(msg), t1; \
|
||||
MOVD $1, t2; \
|
||||
ADDC t0, h0, h0; \
|
||||
ADDE t1, h1, h1; \
|
||||
ADDE t2, h2; \
|
||||
ADD $16, msg
|
||||
|
||||
#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5) \
|
||||
MULLD r0, h0, t0; \
|
||||
MULLD r0, h1, t4; \
|
||||
MULHDU r0, h0, t1; \
|
||||
MULHDU r0, h1, t5; \
|
||||
ADDC t4, t1, t1; \
|
||||
MULLD r0, h2, t2; \
|
||||
ADDZE t5; \
|
||||
MULHDU r1, h0, t4; \
|
||||
MULLD r1, h0, h0; \
|
||||
ADD t5, t2, t2; \
|
||||
ADDC h0, t1, t1; \
|
||||
MULLD h2, r1, t3; \
|
||||
ADDZE t4, h0; \
|
||||
MULHDU r1, h1, t5; \
|
||||
MULLD r1, h1, t4; \
|
||||
ADDC t4, t2, t2; \
|
||||
ADDE t5, t3, t3; \
|
||||
ADDC h0, t2, t2; \
|
||||
MOVD $-4, t4; \
|
||||
MOVD t0, h0; \
|
||||
MOVD t1, h1; \
|
||||
ADDZE t3; \
|
||||
ANDCC $3, t2, h2; \
|
||||
AND t2, t4, t0; \
|
||||
ADDC t0, h0, h0; \
|
||||
ADDE t3, h1, h1; \
|
||||
SLD $62, t3, t4; \
|
||||
SRD $2, t2; \
|
||||
ADDZE h2; \
|
||||
OR t4, t2, t2; \
|
||||
SRD $2, t3; \
|
||||
ADDC t2, h0, h0; \
|
||||
ADDE t3, h1, h1; \
|
||||
ADDZE h2
|
||||
|
||||
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF
|
||||
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
|
||||
GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
|
||||
|
||||
// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
|
||||
|
||||
TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32
|
||||
MOVD state+0(FP), R3
|
||||
MOVD msg_base+8(FP), R4
|
||||
MOVD msg_len+16(FP), R5
|
||||
|
||||
MOVD 0(R3), R8 // h0
|
||||
MOVD 8(R3), R9 // h1
|
||||
MOVD 16(R3), R10 // h2
|
||||
MOVD 24(R3), R11 // r0
|
||||
MOVD 32(R3), R12 // r1
|
||||
|
||||
CMP R5, $16
|
||||
BLT bytes_between_0_and_15
|
||||
|
||||
loop:
|
||||
POLY1305_ADD(R4, R8, R9, R10, R20, R21, R22)
|
||||
|
||||
multiply:
|
||||
POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R16, R17, R18, R14, R20, R21)
|
||||
ADD $-16, R5
|
||||
CMP R5, $16
|
||||
BGE loop
|
||||
|
||||
bytes_between_0_and_15:
|
||||
CMP $0, R5
|
||||
BEQ done
|
||||
MOVD $0, R16 // h0
|
||||
MOVD $0, R17 // h1
|
||||
|
||||
flush_buffer:
|
||||
CMP R5, $8
|
||||
BLE just1
|
||||
|
||||
MOVD $8, R21
|
||||
SUB R21, R5, R21
|
||||
|
||||
// Greater than 8 -- load the rightmost remaining bytes in msg
|
||||
// and put into R17 (h1)
|
||||
MOVD (R4)(R21), R17
|
||||
MOVD $16, R22
|
||||
|
||||
// Find the offset to those bytes
|
||||
SUB R5, R22, R22
|
||||
SLD $3, R22
|
||||
|
||||
// Shift to get only the bytes in msg
|
||||
SRD R22, R17, R17
|
||||
|
||||
// Put 1 at high end
|
||||
MOVD $1, R23
|
||||
SLD $3, R21
|
||||
SLD R21, R23, R23
|
||||
OR R23, R17, R17
|
||||
|
||||
// Remainder is 8
|
||||
MOVD $8, R5
|
||||
|
||||
just1:
|
||||
CMP R5, $8
|
||||
BLT less8
|
||||
|
||||
// Exactly 8
|
||||
MOVD (R4), R16
|
||||
|
||||
CMP $0, R17
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if we've already set R17; if not
|
||||
// set 1 to indicate end of msg.
|
||||
BNE carry
|
||||
MOVD $1, R17
|
||||
BR carry
|
||||
|
||||
less8:
|
||||
MOVD $0, R16 // h0
|
||||
MOVD $0, R22 // shift count
|
||||
CMP R5, $4
|
||||
BLT less4
|
||||
MOVWZ (R4), R16
|
||||
ADD $4, R4
|
||||
ADD $-4, R5
|
||||
MOVD $32, R22
|
||||
|
||||
less4:
|
||||
CMP R5, $2
|
||||
BLT less2
|
||||
MOVHZ (R4), R21
|
||||
SLD R22, R21, R21
|
||||
OR R16, R21, R16
|
||||
ADD $16, R22
|
||||
ADD $-2, R5
|
||||
ADD $2, R4
|
||||
|
||||
less2:
|
||||
CMP $0, R5
|
||||
BEQ insert1
|
||||
MOVBZ (R4), R21
|
||||
SLD R22, R21, R21
|
||||
OR R16, R21, R16
|
||||
ADD $8, R22
|
||||
|
||||
insert1:
|
||||
// Insert 1 at end of msg
|
||||
MOVD $1, R21
|
||||
SLD R22, R21, R21
|
||||
OR R16, R21, R16
|
||||
|
||||
carry:
|
||||
// Add new values to h0, h1, h2
|
||||
ADDC R16, R8
|
||||
ADDE R17, R9
|
||||
ADDE $0, R10
|
||||
MOVD $16, R5
|
||||
ADD R5, R4
|
||||
BR multiply
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
// Save h0, h1, h2 in state
|
||||
MOVD R8, 0(R3)
|
||||
MOVD R9, 8(R3)
|
||||
MOVD R10, 16(R3)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
// func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
|
||||
TEXT ·initialize(SB), $0-16
|
||||
MOVD state+0(FP), R3
|
||||
MOVD key+8(FP), R4
|
||||
|
||||
// state[0...7] is initialized with zero
|
||||
// Load key
|
||||
MOVD 0(R4), R5
|
||||
MOVD 8(R4), R6
|
||||
MOVD 16(R4), R7
|
||||
MOVD 24(R4), R8
|
||||
|
||||
// Address of key mask
|
||||
MOVD $·poly1305Mask<>(SB), R9
|
||||
|
||||
// Save original key in state
|
||||
MOVD R7, 40(R3)
|
||||
MOVD R8, 48(R3)
|
||||
|
||||
// Get mask
|
||||
MOVD (R9), R7
|
||||
MOVD 8(R9), R8
|
||||
|
||||
// And with key
|
||||
AND R5, R7, R5
|
||||
AND R6, R8, R6
|
||||
|
||||
// Save masked key in state
|
||||
MOVD R5, 24(R3)
|
||||
MOVD R6, 32(R3)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
||||
// func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
|
||||
TEXT ·finalize(SB), $0-16
|
||||
MOVD tag+0(FP), R3
|
||||
MOVD state+8(FP), R4
|
||||
|
||||
// Get h0, h1, h2 from state
|
||||
MOVD 0(R4), R5
|
||||
MOVD 8(R4), R6
|
||||
MOVD 16(R4), R7
|
||||
|
||||
// Save h0, h1
|
||||
MOVD R5, R8
|
||||
MOVD R6, R9
|
||||
MOVD $3, R20
|
||||
MOVD $-1, R21
|
||||
SUBC $-5, R5
|
||||
SUBE R21, R6
|
||||
SUBE R20, R7
|
||||
MOVD $0, R21
|
||||
SUBZE R21
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for carry
|
||||
CMP $0, R21
|
||||
ISEL $2, R5, R8, R5
|
||||
ISEL $2, R6, R9, R6
|
||||
MOVD 40(R4), R8
|
||||
MOVD 48(R4), R9
|
||||
ADDC R8, R5
|
||||
ADDE R9, R6
|
||||
MOVD R5, 0(R3)
|
||||
MOVD R6, 8(R3)
|
||||
RET
|
||||
|
|
@ -523,3 +523,117 @@ func (r *retryableAuthMethod) method() string {
|
|||
func RetryableAuthMethod(auth AuthMethod, maxTries int) AuthMethod {
|
||||
return &retryableAuthMethod{authMethod: auth, maxTries: maxTries}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod is an AuthMethod with "gssapi-with-mic" authentication.
|
||||
// See RFC 4462 section 3
|
||||
// gssAPIClient is implementation of the GSSAPIClient interface, see the definition of the interface for details.
|
||||
// target is the server host you want to log in to.
|
||||
func GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod(gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient, target string) AuthMethod {
|
||||
if gssAPIClient == nil {
|
||||
panic("gss-api client must be not nil with enable gssapi-with-mic")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return &gssAPIWithMICCallback{gssAPIClient: gssAPIClient, target: target}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type gssAPIWithMICCallback struct {
|
||||
gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient
|
||||
target string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) {
|
||||
m := &userAuthRequestMsg{
|
||||
User: user,
|
||||
Service: serviceSSH,
|
||||
Method: g.method(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST.
|
||||
// See RFC 4462 section 3.2.
|
||||
m.Payload = appendU32(m.Payload, 1)
|
||||
m.Payload = appendString(m.Payload, string(krb5OID))
|
||||
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(m)); err != nil {
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The server responds to the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST with either an
|
||||
// SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE if none of the mechanisms are supported or
|
||||
// with an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE.
|
||||
// See RFC 4462 section 3.3.
|
||||
// OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication,so I don't want to check
|
||||
// selected mech if it is valid.
|
||||
packet, err := c.readPacket()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
userAuthGSSAPIResp := &userAuthGSSAPIResponse{}
|
||||
if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIResp); err != nil {
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Start the loop into the exchange token.
|
||||
// See RFC 4462 section 3.4.
|
||||
var token []byte
|
||||
defer g.gssAPIClient.DeleteSecContext()
|
||||
for {
|
||||
// Initiates the establishment of a security context between the application and a remote peer.
|
||||
nextToken, needContinue, err := g.gssAPIClient.InitSecContext("host@"+g.target, token, false)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(nextToken) > 0 {
|
||||
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{
|
||||
Token: nextToken,
|
||||
})); err != nil {
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !needContinue {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
packet, err = c.readPacket()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
switch packet[0] {
|
||||
case msgUserAuthFailure:
|
||||
var msg userAuthFailureMsg
|
||||
if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil {
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if msg.PartialSuccess {
|
||||
return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil
|
||||
case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError:
|
||||
userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp := &userAuthGSSAPIError{}
|
||||
if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp); err != nil {
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, fmt.Errorf("GSS-API Error:\n"+
|
||||
"Major Status: %d\n"+
|
||||
"Minor Status: %d\n"+
|
||||
"Error Message: %s\n", userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MajorStatus, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MinorStatus,
|
||||
userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.Message)
|
||||
case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken:
|
||||
userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{}
|
||||
if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil {
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Binding Encryption Keys.
|
||||
// See RFC 4462 section 3.5.
|
||||
micField := buildMIC(string(session), user, "ssh-connection", "gssapi-with-mic")
|
||||
micToken, err := g.gssAPIClient.GetMIC(micField)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIMIC{
|
||||
MIC: micToken,
|
||||
})); err != nil {
|
||||
return authFailure, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return handleAuthResponse(c)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) method() string {
|
||||
return "gssapi-with-mic"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -51,6 +51,13 @@ var supportedKexAlgos = []string{
|
|||
kexAlgoDH14SHA1, kexAlgoDH1SHA1,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// serverForbiddenKexAlgos contains key exchange algorithms, that are forbidden
|
||||
// for the server half.
|
||||
var serverForbiddenKexAlgos = map[string]struct{}{
|
||||
kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1: {}, // server half implementation is only minimal to satisfy the automated tests
|
||||
kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256: {}, // server half implementation is only minimal to satisfy the automated tests
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// supportedHostKeyAlgos specifies the supported host-key algorithms (i.e. methods
|
||||
// of authenticating servers) in preference order.
|
||||
var supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ import (
|
|||
"crypto/elliptic"
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
"crypto/subtle"
|
||||
"encoding/binary"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"fmt"
|
||||
"io"
|
||||
"math/big"
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,6 +26,12 @@ const (
|
|||
kexAlgoECDH384 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
|
||||
kexAlgoECDH521 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
|
||||
kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256 = "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
|
||||
|
||||
// For the following kex only the client half contains a production
|
||||
// ready implementation. The server half only consists of a minimal
|
||||
// implementation to satisfy the automated tests.
|
||||
kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
|
||||
kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// kexResult captures the outcome of a key exchange.
|
||||
|
|
@ -402,6 +410,8 @@ func init() {
|
|||
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH384] = &ecdh{elliptic.P384()}
|
||||
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH256] = &ecdh{elliptic.P256()}
|
||||
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256] = &curve25519sha256{}
|
||||
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA1}
|
||||
kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA256}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// curve25519sha256 implements the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key
|
||||
|
|
@ -538,3 +548,242 @@ func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handsh
|
|||
Hash: crypto.SHA256,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// dhGEXSHA implements the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 and
|
||||
// diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key agreement protocols,
|
||||
// as described in RFC 4419
|
||||
type dhGEXSHA struct {
|
||||
g, p *big.Int
|
||||
hashFunc crypto.Hash
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const numMRTests = 64
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits = 2048
|
||||
dhGroupExchangePreferredBits = 2048
|
||||
dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits = 8192
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func (gex *dhGEXSHA) diffieHellman(theirPublic, myPrivate *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) {
|
||||
if theirPublic.Sign() <= 0 || theirPublic.Cmp(gex.p) >= 0 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds")
|
||||
}
|
||||
return new(big.Int).Exp(theirPublic, myPrivate, gex.p), nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
|
||||
// Send GexRequest
|
||||
kexDHGexRequest := kexDHGexRequestMsg{
|
||||
MinBits: dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits,
|
||||
PreferedBits: dhGroupExchangePreferredBits,
|
||||
MaxBits: dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexRequest)); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Receive GexGroup
|
||||
packet, err := c.readPacket()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var kexDHGexGroup kexDHGexGroupMsg
|
||||
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexGroup); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// reject if p's bit length < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits or > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits
|
||||
if kexDHGexGroup.P.BitLen() < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits || kexDHGexGroup.P.BitLen() > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server-generated gex p is out of range (%d bits)", kexDHGexGroup.P.BitLen())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
gex.p = kexDHGexGroup.P
|
||||
gex.g = kexDHGexGroup.G
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if p is safe by verifing that p and (p-1)/2 are primes
|
||||
one := big.NewInt(1)
|
||||
var pHalf = &big.Int{}
|
||||
pHalf.Rsh(gex.p, 1)
|
||||
if !gex.p.ProbablyPrime(numMRTests) || !pHalf.ProbablyPrime(numMRTests) {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server provided gex p is not safe")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if g is safe by verifing that g > 1 and g < p - 1
|
||||
var pMinusOne = &big.Int{}
|
||||
pMinusOne.Sub(gex.p, one)
|
||||
if gex.g.Cmp(one) != 1 && gex.g.Cmp(pMinusOne) != -1 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server provided gex g is not safe")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Send GexInit
|
||||
x, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
X := new(big.Int).Exp(gex.g, x, gex.p)
|
||||
kexDHGexInit := kexDHGexInitMsg{
|
||||
X: X,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexInit)); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Receive GexReply
|
||||
packet, err = c.readPacket()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var kexDHGexReply kexDHGexReplyMsg
|
||||
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexReply); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
kInt, err := gex.diffieHellman(kexDHGexReply.Y, x)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if k is safe by verifing that k > 1 and k < p - 1
|
||||
if kInt.Cmp(one) != 1 && kInt.Cmp(pMinusOne) != -1 {
|
||||
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: derived k is not safe")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h := gex.hashFunc.New()
|
||||
magics.write(h)
|
||||
writeString(h, kexDHGexReply.HostKey)
|
||||
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits))
|
||||
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits))
|
||||
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits))
|
||||
writeInt(h, gex.p)
|
||||
writeInt(h, gex.g)
|
||||
writeInt(h, X)
|
||||
writeInt(h, kexDHGexReply.Y)
|
||||
K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
|
||||
marshalInt(K, kInt)
|
||||
h.Write(K)
|
||||
|
||||
return &kexResult{
|
||||
H: h.Sum(nil),
|
||||
K: K,
|
||||
HostKey: kexDHGexReply.HostKey,
|
||||
Signature: kexDHGexReply.Signature,
|
||||
Hash: gex.hashFunc,
|
||||
}, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Server half implementation of the Diffie Hellman Key Exchange with SHA1 and SHA256.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This is a minimal implementation to satisfy the automated tests.
|
||||
func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) {
|
||||
// Receive GexRequest
|
||||
packet, err := c.readPacket()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var kexDHGexRequest kexDHGexRequestMsg
|
||||
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexRequest); err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// smoosh the user's preferred size into our own limits
|
||||
if kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits {
|
||||
kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits = dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits
|
||||
}
|
||||
if kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits {
|
||||
kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits = dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits
|
||||
}
|
||||
// fix min/max if they're inconsistent. technically, we could just pout
|
||||
// and hang up, but there's no harm in giving them the benefit of the
|
||||
// doubt and just picking a bitsize for them.
|
||||
if kexDHGexRequest.MinBits > kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits {
|
||||
kexDHGexRequest.MinBits = kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits
|
||||
}
|
||||
if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits {
|
||||
kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits = kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Send GexGroup
|
||||
// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC
|
||||
// 4253 and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526.
|
||||
p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString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
|
||||
gex.p = p
|
||||
gex.g = big.NewInt(2)
|
||||
|
||||
kexDHGexGroup := kexDHGexGroupMsg{
|
||||
P: gex.p,
|
||||
G: gex.g,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexGroup)); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Receive GexInit
|
||||
packet, err = c.readPacket()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
var kexDHGexInit kexDHGexInitMsg
|
||||
if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexInit); err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var pHalf = &big.Int{}
|
||||
pHalf.Rsh(gex.p, 1)
|
||||
|
||||
y, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Y := new(big.Int).Exp(gex.g, y, gex.p)
|
||||
kInt, err := gex.diffieHellman(kexDHGexInit.X, y)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal()
|
||||
|
||||
h := gex.hashFunc.New()
|
||||
magics.write(h)
|
||||
writeString(h, hostKeyBytes)
|
||||
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits))
|
||||
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits))
|
||||
binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits))
|
||||
writeInt(h, gex.p)
|
||||
writeInt(h, gex.g)
|
||||
writeInt(h, kexDHGexInit.X)
|
||||
writeInt(h, Y)
|
||||
|
||||
K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
|
||||
marshalInt(K, kInt)
|
||||
h.Write(K)
|
||||
|
||||
H := h.Sum(nil)
|
||||
|
||||
// H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its
|
||||
// own key-specific hash algorithm.
|
||||
sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
kexDHGexReply := kexDHGexReplyMsg{
|
||||
HostKey: hostKeyBytes,
|
||||
Y: Y,
|
||||
Signature: sig,
|
||||
}
|
||||
packet = Marshal(&kexDHGexReply)
|
||||
|
||||
err = c.writePacket(packet)
|
||||
|
||||
return &kexResult{
|
||||
H: H,
|
||||
K: K,
|
||||
HostKey: hostKeyBytes,
|
||||
Signature: sig,
|
||||
Hash: gex.hashFunc,
|
||||
}, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -97,6 +97,36 @@ type kexDHReplyMsg struct {
|
|||
Signature []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// See RFC 4419, section 5.
|
||||
const msgKexDHGexGroup = 31
|
||||
|
||||
type kexDHGexGroupMsg struct {
|
||||
P *big.Int `sshtype:"31"`
|
||||
G *big.Int
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const msgKexDHGexInit = 32
|
||||
|
||||
type kexDHGexInitMsg struct {
|
||||
X *big.Int `sshtype:"32"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const msgKexDHGexReply = 33
|
||||
|
||||
type kexDHGexReplyMsg struct {
|
||||
HostKey []byte `sshtype:"33"`
|
||||
Y *big.Int
|
||||
Signature []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const msgKexDHGexRequest = 34
|
||||
|
||||
type kexDHGexRequestMsg struct {
|
||||
MinBits uint32 `sshtype:"34"`
|
||||
PreferedBits uint32
|
||||
MaxBits uint32
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// See RFC 4253, section 10.
|
||||
const msgServiceRequest = 5
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -275,6 +305,42 @@ type userAuthPubKeyOkMsg struct {
|
|||
PubKey []byte
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// See RFC 4462, section 3
|
||||
const msgUserAuthGSSAPIResponse = 60
|
||||
|
||||
type userAuthGSSAPIResponse struct {
|
||||
SupportMech []byte `sshtype:"60"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken = 61
|
||||
|
||||
type userAuthGSSAPIToken struct {
|
||||
Token []byte `sshtype:"61"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC = 66
|
||||
|
||||
type userAuthGSSAPIMIC struct {
|
||||
MIC []byte `sshtype:"66"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// See RFC 4462, section 3.9
|
||||
const msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok = 64
|
||||
|
||||
type userAuthGSSAPIErrTok struct {
|
||||
ErrorToken []byte `sshtype:"64"`
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// See RFC 4462, section 3.8
|
||||
const msgUserAuthGSSAPIError = 65
|
||||
|
||||
type userAuthGSSAPIError struct {
|
||||
MajorStatus uint32 `sshtype:"65"`
|
||||
MinorStatus uint32
|
||||
Message string
|
||||
LanguageTag string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// typeTags returns the possible type bytes for the given reflect.Type, which
|
||||
// should be a struct. The possible values are separated by a '|' character.
|
||||
func typeTags(structType reflect.Type) (tags []byte) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -756,6 +822,14 @@ func decode(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) {
|
|||
msg = new(channelRequestSuccessMsg)
|
||||
case msgChannelFailure:
|
||||
msg = new(channelRequestFailureMsg)
|
||||
case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken:
|
||||
msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIToken)
|
||||
case msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC:
|
||||
msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIMIC)
|
||||
case msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok:
|
||||
msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIErrTok)
|
||||
case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError:
|
||||
msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIError)
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return nil, unexpectedMessageError(0, packet[0])
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -45,6 +45,20 @@ type Permissions struct {
|
|||
Extensions map[string]string
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct {
|
||||
// AllowLogin, must be set, is called when gssapi-with-mic
|
||||
// authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). The srcName is from the
|
||||
// results of the GSS-API authentication. The format is username@DOMAIN.
|
||||
// GSSAPI just guarantees to the server who the user is, but not if they can log in, and with what permissions.
|
||||
// This callback is called after the user identity is established with GSSAPI to decide if the user can login with
|
||||
// which permissions. If the user is allowed to login, it should return a nil error.
|
||||
AllowLogin func(conn ConnMetadata, srcName string) (*Permissions, error)
|
||||
|
||||
// Server must be set. It's the implementation
|
||||
// of the GSSAPIServer interface. See GSSAPIServer interface for details.
|
||||
Server GSSAPIServer
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ServerConfig holds server specific configuration data.
|
||||
type ServerConfig struct {
|
||||
// Config contains configuration shared between client and server.
|
||||
|
|
@ -99,6 +113,10 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
|
|||
// BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to
|
||||
// the client after key exchange completed but before authentication.
|
||||
BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string
|
||||
|
||||
// GSSAPIWithMICConfig includes gssapi server and callback, which if both non-nil, is used
|
||||
// when gssapi-with-mic authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3).
|
||||
GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host
|
||||
|
|
@ -175,6 +193,12 @@ func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewCha
|
|||
if fullConf.MaxAuthTries == 0 {
|
||||
fullConf.MaxAuthTries = 6
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Check if the config contains any unsupported key exchanges
|
||||
for _, kex := range fullConf.KeyExchanges {
|
||||
if _, ok := serverForbiddenKexAlgos[kex]; ok {
|
||||
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key exchange %s for server", kex)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
s := &connection{
|
||||
sshConn: sshConn{conn: c},
|
||||
|
|
@ -204,7 +228,9 @@ func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error)
|
|||
return nil, errors.New("ssh: server has no host keys")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil && config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
|
||||
if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil &&
|
||||
config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && (config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil ||
|
||||
config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin == nil || config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server == nil) {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -295,6 +321,55 @@ func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error {
|
|||
return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, firstToken []byte, s *connection,
|
||||
sessionID []byte, userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg) (authErr error, perms *Permissions, err error) {
|
||||
gssAPIServer := gssapiConfig.Server
|
||||
defer gssAPIServer.DeleteSecContext()
|
||||
var srcName string
|
||||
for {
|
||||
var (
|
||||
outToken []byte
|
||||
needContinue bool
|
||||
)
|
||||
outToken, srcName, needContinue, err = gssAPIServer.AcceptSecContext(firstToken)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return err, nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(outToken) != 0 {
|
||||
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{
|
||||
Token: outToken,
|
||||
})); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !needContinue {
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{}
|
||||
if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
userAuthGSSAPIMICReq := &userAuthGSSAPIMIC{}
|
||||
if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
mic := buildMIC(string(sessionID), userAuthReq.User, userAuthReq.Service, userAuthReq.Method)
|
||||
if err := gssAPIServer.VerifyMIC(mic, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq.MIC); err != nil {
|
||||
return err, nil, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
perms, authErr = gssapiConfig.AllowLogin(s, srcName)
|
||||
return authErr, perms, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is
|
||||
// sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication
|
||||
// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication
|
||||
|
|
@ -496,6 +571,49 @@ userAuthLoop:
|
|||
authErr = candidate.result
|
||||
perms = candidate.perms
|
||||
}
|
||||
case "gssapi-with-mic":
|
||||
gssapiConfig := config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig
|
||||
userAuthRequestGSSAPI, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(userAuthReq.Payload)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication.
|
||||
if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N == 0 {
|
||||
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: Mechanism negotiation is not supported")
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
var i uint32
|
||||
present := false
|
||||
for i = 0; i < userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N; i++ {
|
||||
if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.OIDS[i].Equal(krb5Mesh) {
|
||||
present = true
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !present {
|
||||
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: GSSAPI authentication must use the Kerberos V5 mechanism")
|
||||
break
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Initial server response, see RFC 4462 section 3.3.
|
||||
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIResponse{
|
||||
SupportMech: krb5OID,
|
||||
})); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Exchange token, see RFC 4462 section 3.4.
|
||||
packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{}
|
||||
if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
authErr, perms, err = gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token, s, sessionID,
|
||||
userAuthReq)
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
default:
|
||||
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown method %q", userAuthReq.Method)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -522,6 +640,10 @@ userAuthLoop:
|
|||
if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil {
|
||||
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil &&
|
||||
config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil {
|
||||
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
|
|||
// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
||||
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
||||
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
||||
|
||||
package ssh
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"encoding/asn1"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
var krb5OID []byte
|
||||
|
||||
func init() {
|
||||
krb5OID, _ = asn1.Marshal(krb5Mesh)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GSSAPIClient provides the API to plug-in GSSAPI authentication for client logins.
|
||||
type GSSAPIClient interface {
|
||||
// InitSecContext initiates the establishment of a security context for GSS-API between the
|
||||
// ssh client and ssh server. Initially the token parameter should be specified as nil.
|
||||
// The routine may return a outputToken which should be transferred to
|
||||
// the ssh server, where the ssh server will present it to
|
||||
// AcceptSecContext. If no token need be sent, InitSecContext will indicate this by setting
|
||||
// needContinue to false. To complete the context
|
||||
// establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the ssh
|
||||
// server;if so, InitSecContext will return a needContinue which is true.
|
||||
// In this case, InitSecContext should be called again when the
|
||||
// reply token is received from the ssh server, passing the reply
|
||||
// token to InitSecContext via the token parameters.
|
||||
// See RFC 2743 section 2.2.1 and RFC 4462 section 3.4.
|
||||
InitSecContext(target string, token []byte, isGSSDelegCreds bool) (outputToken []byte, needContinue bool, err error)
|
||||
// GetMIC generates a cryptographic MIC for the SSH2 message, and places
|
||||
// the MIC in a token for transfer to the ssh server.
|
||||
// The contents of the MIC field are obtained by calling GSS_GetMIC()
|
||||
// over the following, using the GSS-API context that was just
|
||||
// established:
|
||||
// string session identifier
|
||||
// byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
|
||||
// string user name
|
||||
// string service
|
||||
// string "gssapi-with-mic"
|
||||
// See RFC 2743 section 2.3.1 and RFC 4462 3.5.
|
||||
GetMIC(micFiled []byte) ([]byte, error)
|
||||
// Whenever possible, it should be possible for
|
||||
// DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even
|
||||
// if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related
|
||||
// resources to be released.
|
||||
// In addition to deleting established security contexts,
|
||||
// gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built"
|
||||
// security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of
|
||||
// InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls.
|
||||
// See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3.
|
||||
DeleteSecContext() error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GSSAPIServer provides the API to plug in GSSAPI authentication for server logins.
|
||||
type GSSAPIServer interface {
|
||||
// AcceptSecContext allows a remotely initiated security context between the application
|
||||
// and a remote peer to be established by the ssh client. The routine may return a
|
||||
// outputToken which should be transferred to the ssh client,
|
||||
// where the ssh client will present it to InitSecContext.
|
||||
// If no token need be sent, AcceptSecContext will indicate this
|
||||
// by setting the needContinue to false. To
|
||||
// complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be
|
||||
// required from the ssh client. if so, AcceptSecContext
|
||||
// will return a needContinue which is true, in which case it
|
||||
// should be called again when the reply token is received from the ssh
|
||||
// client, passing the token to AcceptSecContext via the
|
||||
// token parameters.
|
||||
// The srcName return value is the authenticated username.
|
||||
// See RFC 2743 section 2.2.2 and RFC 4462 section 3.4.
|
||||
AcceptSecContext(token []byte) (outputToken []byte, srcName string, needContinue bool, err error)
|
||||
// VerifyMIC verifies that a cryptographic MIC, contained in the token parameter,
|
||||
// fits the supplied message is received from the ssh client.
|
||||
// See RFC 2743 section 2.3.2.
|
||||
VerifyMIC(micField []byte, micToken []byte) error
|
||||
// Whenever possible, it should be possible for
|
||||
// DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even
|
||||
// if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related
|
||||
// resources to be released.
|
||||
// In addition to deleting established security contexts,
|
||||
// gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built"
|
||||
// security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of
|
||||
// InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls.
|
||||
// See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3.
|
||||
DeleteSecContext() error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
var (
|
||||
// OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication,
|
||||
// so we also support the krb5 mechanism only.
|
||||
// See RFC 1964 section 1.
|
||||
krb5Mesh = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113554, 1, 2, 2}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
|
||||
// See RFC 4462 section 3.2.
|
||||
type userAuthRequestGSSAPI struct {
|
||||
N uint32
|
||||
OIDS []asn1.ObjectIdentifier
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) {
|
||||
n, rest, ok := parseUint32(payload)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("parse uint32 failed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
s := &userAuthRequestGSSAPI{
|
||||
N: n,
|
||||
OIDS: make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, n),
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := 0; i < int(n); i++ {
|
||||
var (
|
||||
desiredMech []byte
|
||||
err error
|
||||
)
|
||||
desiredMech, rest, ok = parseString(rest)
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
return nil, errors.New("parse string failed")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(desiredMech, &s.OIDS[i]); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
return s, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// See RFC 4462 section 3.6.
|
||||
func buildMIC(sessionID string, username string, service string, authMethod string) []byte {
|
||||
out := make([]byte, 0, 0)
|
||||
out = appendString(out, sessionID)
|
||||
out = append(out, msgUserAuthRequest)
|
||||
out = appendString(out, username)
|
||||
out = appendString(out, service)
|
||||
out = appendString(out, authMethod)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ go.opencensus.io/trace/propagation
|
|||
go.opencensus.io
|
||||
go.opencensus.io/stats/internal
|
||||
go.opencensus.io/internal/tagencoding
|
||||
# golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190426145343-a29dc8fdc734
|
||||
# golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190701094942-4def268fd1a4
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/ssh
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent
|
||||
golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue