407 lines
12 KiB
Go
407 lines
12 KiB
Go
package nebula
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import (
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"encoding/binary"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/flynn/noise"
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"github.com/golang/protobuf/proto"
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"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/cert"
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"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
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)
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const (
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minFwPacketLen = 4
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)
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func (f *Interface) readOutsidePackets(addr *udpAddr, out []byte, packet []byte, header *Header, fwPacket *FirewallPacket, lhh *LightHouseHandler, nb []byte, q int) {
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err := header.Parse(packet)
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if err != nil {
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// TODO: best if we return this and let caller log
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// TODO: Might be better to send the literal []byte("holepunch") packet and ignore that?
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// Hole punch packets are 0 or 1 byte big, so lets ignore printing those errors
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if len(packet) > 1 {
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l.WithField("packet", packet).Infof("Error while parsing inbound packet from %s: %s", addr, err)
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}
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return
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}
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//l.Error("in packet ", header, packet[HeaderLen:])
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// verify if we've seen this index before, otherwise respond to the handshake initiation
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hostinfo, err := f.hostMap.QueryIndex(header.RemoteIndex)
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var ci *ConnectionState
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if err == nil {
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ci = hostinfo.ConnectionState
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}
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switch header.Type {
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case message:
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if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, header) {
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return
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}
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f.decryptToTun(hostinfo, header.MessageCounter, out, packet, fwPacket, nb, q)
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// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
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case lightHouse:
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f.messageMetrics.Rx(header.Type, header.Subtype, 1)
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if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, header) {
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return
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}
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d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, header.MessageCounter, out, packet, header, nb)
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if err != nil {
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hostinfo.logger().WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
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WithField("packet", packet).
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Error("Failed to decrypt lighthouse packet")
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//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
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//f.sendRecvError(net.Addr(addr), header.RemoteIndex)
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return
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}
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lhh.HandleRequest(addr, hostinfo.hostId, d, hostinfo.GetCert(), f)
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// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
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case test:
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f.messageMetrics.Rx(header.Type, header.Subtype, 1)
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if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, header) {
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return
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}
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d, err := f.decrypt(hostinfo, header.MessageCounter, out, packet, header, nb)
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if err != nil {
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hostinfo.logger().WithError(err).WithField("udpAddr", addr).
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WithField("packet", packet).
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Error("Failed to decrypt test packet")
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//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
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//f.sendRecvError(net.Addr(addr), header.RemoteIndex)
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return
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}
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if header.Subtype == testRequest {
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// This testRequest might be from TryPromoteBest, so we should roam
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// to the new IP address before responding
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f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, addr)
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f.send(test, testReply, ci, hostinfo, hostinfo.remote, d, nb, out)
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}
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// Fallthrough to the bottom to record incoming traffic
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// Non encrypted messages below here, they should not fall through to avoid tracking incoming traffic since they
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// are unauthenticated
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case handshake:
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f.messageMetrics.Rx(header.Type, header.Subtype, 1)
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HandleIncomingHandshake(f, addr, packet, header, hostinfo)
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return
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case recvError:
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f.messageMetrics.Rx(header.Type, header.Subtype, 1)
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// TODO: Remove this with recv_error deprecation
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f.handleRecvError(addr, header)
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return
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case closeTunnel:
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f.messageMetrics.Rx(header.Type, header.Subtype, 1)
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if !f.handleEncrypted(ci, addr, header) {
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return
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}
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hostinfo.logger().WithField("udpAddr", addr).
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Info("Close tunnel received, tearing down.")
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f.closeTunnel(hostinfo)
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return
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default:
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f.messageMetrics.Rx(header.Type, header.Subtype, 1)
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hostinfo.logger().Debugf("Unexpected packet received from %s", addr)
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return
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}
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f.handleHostRoaming(hostinfo, addr)
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f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo.hostId)
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}
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func (f *Interface) closeTunnel(hostInfo *HostInfo) {
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//TODO: this would be better as a single function in ConnectionManager that handled locks appropriately
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f.connectionManager.ClearIP(hostInfo.hostId)
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f.connectionManager.ClearPendingDeletion(hostInfo.hostId)
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f.lightHouse.DeleteVpnIP(hostInfo.hostId)
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f.hostMap.DeleteHostInfo(hostInfo)
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}
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func (f *Interface) handleHostRoaming(hostinfo *HostInfo, addr *udpAddr) {
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if hostDidRoam(hostinfo.remote, addr) {
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if !f.lightHouse.remoteAllowList.Allow(udp2ipInt(addr)) {
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hostinfo.logger().WithField("newAddr", addr).Debug("lighthouse.remote_allow_list denied roaming")
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return
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}
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if !hostinfo.lastRoam.IsZero() && addr.Equals(hostinfo.lastRoamRemote) && time.Since(hostinfo.lastRoam) < RoamingSuppressSeconds*time.Second {
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if l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
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hostinfo.logger().WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", addr).
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Debugf("Suppressing roam back to previous remote for %d seconds", RoamingSuppressSeconds)
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}
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return
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}
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hostinfo.logger().WithField("udpAddr", hostinfo.remote).WithField("newAddr", addr).
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Info("Host roamed to new udp ip/port.")
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hostinfo.lastRoam = time.Now()
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remoteCopy := *hostinfo.remote
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hostinfo.lastRoamRemote = &remoteCopy
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hostinfo.SetRemote(*addr)
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if f.lightHouse.amLighthouse {
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f.lightHouse.AddRemote(hostinfo.hostId, addr, false)
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}
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}
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}
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func (f *Interface) handleEncrypted(ci *ConnectionState, addr *udpAddr, header *Header) bool {
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// If connectionstate exists and the replay protector allows, process packet
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// Else, send recv errors for 300 seconds after a restart to allow fast reconnection.
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if ci == nil || !ci.window.Check(header.MessageCounter) {
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f.sendRecvError(addr, header.RemoteIndex)
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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// newPacket validates and parses the interesting bits for the firewall out of the ip and sub protocol headers
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func newPacket(data []byte, incoming bool, fp *FirewallPacket) error {
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// Do we at least have an ipv4 header worth of data?
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if len(data) < ipv4.HeaderLen {
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return fmt.Errorf("packet is less than %v bytes", ipv4.HeaderLen)
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}
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// Is it an ipv4 packet?
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if int((data[0]>>4)&0x0f) != 4 {
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return fmt.Errorf("packet is not ipv4, type: %v", int((data[0]>>4)&0x0f))
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}
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// Adjust our start position based on the advertised ip header length
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ihl := int(data[0]&0x0f) << 2
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// Well formed ip header length?
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if ihl < ipv4.HeaderLen {
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return fmt.Errorf("packet had an invalid header length: %v", ihl)
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}
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// Check if this is the second or further fragment of a fragmented packet.
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flagsfrags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[6:8])
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fp.Fragment = (flagsfrags & 0x1FFF) != 0
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// Firewall handles protocol checks
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fp.Protocol = data[9]
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// Accounting for a variable header length, do we have enough data for our src/dst tuples?
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minLen := ihl
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if !fp.Fragment && fp.Protocol != fwProtoICMP {
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minLen += minFwPacketLen
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}
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if len(data) < minLen {
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return fmt.Errorf("packet is less than %v bytes, ip header len: %v", minLen, ihl)
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}
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// Firewall packets are locally oriented
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if incoming {
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fp.RemoteIP = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[12:16])
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fp.LocalIP = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[16:20])
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if fp.Fragment || fp.Protocol == fwProtoICMP {
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fp.RemotePort = 0
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fp.LocalPort = 0
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} else {
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fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2])
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fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
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}
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} else {
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fp.LocalIP = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[12:16])
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fp.RemoteIP = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(data[16:20])
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if fp.Fragment || fp.Protocol == fwProtoICMP {
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fp.RemotePort = 0
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fp.LocalPort = 0
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} else {
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fp.LocalPort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl : ihl+2])
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fp.RemotePort = binary.BigEndian.Uint16(data[ihl+2 : ihl+4])
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (f *Interface) decrypt(hostinfo *HostInfo, mc uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, header *Header, nb []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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var err error
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out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:HeaderLen], packet[HeaderLen:], mc, nb)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(mc) {
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hostinfo.logger().WithField("header", header).
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Debugln("dropping out of window packet")
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return nil, errors.New("out of window packet")
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (f *Interface) decryptToTun(hostinfo *HostInfo, messageCounter uint64, out []byte, packet []byte, fwPacket *FirewallPacket, nb []byte, q int) {
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var err error
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out, err = hostinfo.ConnectionState.dKey.DecryptDanger(out, packet[:HeaderLen], packet[HeaderLen:], messageCounter, nb)
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if err != nil {
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hostinfo.logger().WithError(err).Error("Failed to decrypt packet")
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//TODO: maybe after build 64 is out? 06/14/2018 - NB
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//f.sendRecvError(hostinfo.remote, header.RemoteIndex)
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return
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}
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err = newPacket(out, true, fwPacket)
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if err != nil {
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hostinfo.logger().WithError(err).WithField("packet", out).
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Warnf("Error while validating inbound packet")
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return
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}
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if !hostinfo.ConnectionState.window.Update(messageCounter) {
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hostinfo.logger().WithField("fwPacket", fwPacket).
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Debugln("dropping out of window packet")
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return
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}
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dropReason := f.firewall.Drop(out, *fwPacket, true, hostinfo, trustedCAs)
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if dropReason != nil {
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if l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
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hostinfo.logger().WithField("fwPacket", fwPacket).
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WithField("reason", dropReason).
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Debugln("dropping inbound packet")
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}
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return
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}
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f.connectionManager.In(hostinfo.hostId)
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_, err = f.readers[q].Write(out)
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if err != nil {
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l.WithError(err).Error("Failed to write to tun")
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}
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}
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func (f *Interface) sendRecvError(endpoint *udpAddr, index uint32) {
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f.messageMetrics.Tx(recvError, 0, 1)
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//TODO: this should be a signed message so we can trust that we should drop the index
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b := HeaderEncode(make([]byte, HeaderLen), Version, uint8(recvError), 0, index, 0)
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f.outside.WriteTo(b, endpoint)
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if l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
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l.WithField("index", index).
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WithField("udpAddr", endpoint).
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Debug("Recv error sent")
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}
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}
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func (f *Interface) handleRecvError(addr *udpAddr, h *Header) {
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// This flag is to stop caring about recv_error from old versions
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// This should go away when the old version is gone from prod
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if l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
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l.WithField("index", h.RemoteIndex).
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WithField("udpAddr", addr).
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Debug("Recv error received")
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}
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hostinfo, err := f.hostMap.QueryReverseIndex(h.RemoteIndex)
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if err != nil {
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l.Debugln(err, ": ", h.RemoteIndex)
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return
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}
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if !hostinfo.RecvErrorExceeded() {
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return
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}
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if hostinfo.remote != nil && hostinfo.remote.String() != addr.String() {
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l.Infoln("Someone spoofing recv_errors? ", addr, hostinfo.remote)
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return
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}
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// We delete this host from the main hostmap
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f.hostMap.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
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// We also delete it from pending to allow for
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// fast reconnect. We must null the connectionstate
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// or a counter reuse may happen
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hostinfo.ConnectionState = nil
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f.handshakeManager.DeleteHostInfo(hostinfo)
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}
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/*
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func (f *Interface) sendMeta(ci *ConnectionState, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, meta *NebulaMeta) {
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if ci.eKey != nil {
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//TODO: log error?
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return
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}
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msg, err := proto.Marshal(meta)
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if err != nil {
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l.Debugln("failed to encode header")
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}
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c := ci.messageCounter
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b := HeaderEncode(nil, Version, uint8(metadata), 0, hostinfo.remoteIndexId, c)
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ci.messageCounter++
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msg := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(b, nil, msg, c)
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//msg := ci.eKey.EncryptDanger(b, nil, []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%d", counter)), c)
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f.outside.WriteTo(msg, endpoint)
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}
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*/
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func RecombineCertAndValidate(h *noise.HandshakeState, rawCertBytes []byte) (*cert.NebulaCertificate, error) {
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pk := h.PeerStatic()
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if pk == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("no peer static key was present")
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}
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if rawCertBytes == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("provided payload was empty")
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}
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r := &cert.RawNebulaCertificate{}
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err := proto.Unmarshal(rawCertBytes, r)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error unmarshaling cert: %s", err)
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}
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// If the Details are nil, just exit to avoid crashing
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if r.Details == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate did not contain any details")
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}
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r.Details.PublicKey = pk
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recombined, err := proto.Marshal(r)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while recombining certificate: %s", err)
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}
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c, _ := cert.UnmarshalNebulaCertificate(recombined)
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isValid, err := c.Verify(time.Now(), trustedCAs)
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if err != nil {
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return c, fmt.Errorf("certificate validation failed: %s", err)
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} else if !isValid {
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// This case should never happen but here's to defensive programming!
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return c, errors.New("certificate validation failed but did not return an error")
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}
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return c, nil
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}
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