2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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package nebula
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import (
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2021-11-02 19:14:26 +01:00
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"context"
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2021-04-01 17:23:31 +02:00
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"encoding/binary"
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2020-11-23 20:50:01 +01:00
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"errors"
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/golang/protobuf/proto"
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2020-06-26 19:45:48 +02:00
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"github.com/rcrowley/go-metrics"
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2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
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"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/header"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/iputil"
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"github.com/slackhq/nebula/udp"
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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)
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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//TODO: if a lighthouse doesn't have an answer, clients AGGRESSIVELY REQUERY.. why? handshake manager and/or getOrHandshake?
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2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
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//TODO: nodes are roaming lighthouses, this is bad. How are they learning?
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2020-11-23 20:50:01 +01:00
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var ErrHostNotKnown = errors.New("host not known")
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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type LightHouse struct {
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2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
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//TODO: We need a timer wheel to kick out vpnIps that haven't reported in a long time
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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sync.RWMutex //Because we concurrently read and write to our maps
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amLighthouse bool
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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myVpnIp iputil.VpnIp
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myVpnZeros iputil.VpnIp
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punchConn *udp.Conn
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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// Local cache of answers from light houses
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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// map of vpn Ip to answers
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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addrMap map[iputil.VpnIp]*RemoteList
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
2020-04-08 21:36:43 +02:00
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// filters remote addresses allowed for each host
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// - When we are a lighthouse, this filters what addresses we store and
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// respond with.
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// - When we are not a lighthouse, this filters which addresses we accept
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// from lighthouses.
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2021-10-19 16:54:30 +02:00
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remoteAllowList *RemoteAllowList
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Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
2020-04-08 21:36:43 +02:00
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// filters local addresses that we advertise to lighthouses
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2021-10-19 16:54:30 +02:00
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localAllowList *LocalAllowList
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Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
2020-04-08 21:36:43 +02:00
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2020-07-22 16:35:10 +02:00
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// used to trigger the HandshakeManager when we receive HostQueryReply
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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handshakeTrigger chan<- iputil.VpnIp
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2020-07-22 16:35:10 +02:00
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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// staticList exists to avoid having a bool in each addrMap entry
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// since static should be rare
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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staticList map[iputil.VpnIp]struct{}
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lighthouses map[iputil.VpnIp]struct{}
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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interval int
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2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
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nebulaPort uint32 // 32 bits because protobuf does not have a uint16
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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punchBack bool
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2020-03-27 19:26:39 +01:00
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punchDelay time.Duration
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2020-06-26 19:45:48 +02:00
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metrics *MessageMetrics
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metricHolepunchTx metrics.Counter
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2021-03-26 15:46:30 +01:00
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l *logrus.Logger
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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}
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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func NewLightHouse(l *logrus.Logger, amLighthouse bool, myVpnIpNet *net.IPNet, ips []iputil.VpnIp, interval int, nebulaPort uint32, pc *udp.Conn, punchBack bool, punchDelay time.Duration, metricsEnabled bool) *LightHouse {
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2021-04-01 17:23:31 +02:00
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ones, _ := myVpnIpNet.Mask.Size()
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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h := LightHouse{
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amLighthouse: amLighthouse,
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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myVpnIp: iputil.Ip2VpnIp(myVpnIpNet.IP),
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myVpnZeros: iputil.VpnIp(32 - ones),
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addrMap: make(map[iputil.VpnIp]*RemoteList),
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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nebulaPort: nebulaPort,
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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lighthouses: make(map[iputil.VpnIp]struct{}),
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staticList: make(map[iputil.VpnIp]struct{}),
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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interval: interval,
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punchConn: pc,
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punchBack: punchBack,
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2020-03-27 19:26:39 +01:00
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punchDelay: punchDelay,
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2021-03-26 15:46:30 +01:00
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l: l,
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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}
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2020-06-26 19:45:48 +02:00
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if metricsEnabled {
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h.metrics = newLighthouseMetrics()
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h.metricHolepunchTx = metrics.GetOrRegisterCounter("messages.tx.holepunch", nil)
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} else {
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h.metricHolepunchTx = metrics.NilCounter{}
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}
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2019-12-10 01:53:56 +01:00
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for _, ip := range ips {
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h.lighthouses[ip] = struct{}{}
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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}
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return &h
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}
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2021-10-19 16:54:30 +02:00
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func (lh *LightHouse) SetRemoteAllowList(allowList *RemoteAllowList) {
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Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
2020-04-08 21:36:43 +02:00
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lh.Lock()
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defer lh.Unlock()
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lh.remoteAllowList = allowList
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}
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2021-10-19 16:54:30 +02:00
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func (lh *LightHouse) SetLocalAllowList(allowList *LocalAllowList) {
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Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
2020-04-08 21:36:43 +02:00
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lh.Lock()
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defer lh.Unlock()
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lh.localAllowList = allowList
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}
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2019-11-24 00:55:23 +01:00
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func (lh *LightHouse) ValidateLHStaticEntries() error {
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2019-11-23 22:46:45 +01:00
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for lhIP, _ := range lh.lighthouses {
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2020-01-03 03:04:18 +01:00
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if _, ok := lh.staticList[lhIP]; !ok {
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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return fmt.Errorf("Lighthouse %s does not have a static_host_map entry", lhIP)
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2019-11-23 22:46:45 +01:00
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}
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}
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2019-11-24 00:55:23 +01:00
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return nil
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2019-11-23 22:46:45 +01:00
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}
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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func (lh *LightHouse) Query(ip iputil.VpnIp, f udp.EncWriter) *RemoteList {
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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if !lh.IsLighthouseIP(ip) {
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lh.QueryServer(ip, f)
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}
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lh.RLock()
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if v, ok := lh.addrMap[ip]; ok {
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lh.RUnlock()
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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return v
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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}
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lh.RUnlock()
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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return nil
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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}
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// This is asynchronous so no reply should be expected
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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func (lh *LightHouse) QueryServer(ip iputil.VpnIp, f udp.EncWriter) {
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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if lh.amLighthouse {
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return
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}
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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if lh.IsLighthouseIP(ip) {
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return
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}
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// Send a query to the lighthouses and hope for the best next time
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query, err := proto.Marshal(NewLhQueryByInt(ip))
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if err != nil {
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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lh.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnIp", ip).Error("Failed to marshal lighthouse query payload")
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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return
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}
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lh.metricTx(NebulaMeta_HostQuery, int64(len(lh.lighthouses)))
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nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
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out := make([]byte, mtu)
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for n := range lh.lighthouses {
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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f.SendMessageToVpnIp(header.LightHouse, 0, n, query, nb, out)
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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}
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}
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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func (lh *LightHouse) QueryCache(ip iputil.VpnIp) *RemoteList {
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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lh.RLock()
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if v, ok := lh.addrMap[ip]; ok {
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lh.RUnlock()
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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return v
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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}
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lh.RUnlock()
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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lh.Lock()
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defer lh.Unlock()
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// Add an entry if we don't already have one
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return lh.unlockedGetRemoteList(ip)
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2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
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}
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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// queryAndPrepMessage is a lock helper on RemoteList, assisting the caller to build a lighthouse message containing
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// details from the remote list. It looks for a hit in the addrMap and a hit in the RemoteList under the owner vpnIp
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// If one is found then f() is called with proper locking, f() must return result of n.MarshalTo()
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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func (lh *LightHouse) queryAndPrepMessage(vpnIp iputil.VpnIp, f func(*cache) (int, error)) (bool, int, error) {
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2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
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lh.RLock()
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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// Do we have an entry in the main cache?
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if v, ok := lh.addrMap[vpnIp]; ok {
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// Swap lh lock for remote list lock
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v.RLock()
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defer v.RUnlock()
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2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
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lh.RUnlock()
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2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
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// vpnIp should also be the owner here since we are a lighthouse.
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c := v.cache[vpnIp]
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// Make sure we have
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if c != nil {
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n, err := f(c)
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return true, n, err
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}
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return false, 0, nil
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2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
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}
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lh.RUnlock()
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return false, 0, nil
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}
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2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
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|
|
func (lh *LightHouse) DeleteVpnIp(vpnIp iputil.VpnIp) {
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
// First we check the static mapping
|
|
|
|
// and do nothing if it is there
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if _, ok := lh.staticList[vpnIp]; ok {
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lh.Lock()
|
|
|
|
//l.Debugln(lh.addrMap)
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
delete(lh.addrMap, vpnIp)
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if lh.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
lh.l.Debugf("deleting %s from lighthouse.", vpnIp)
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
lh.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
// AddStaticRemote adds a static host entry for vpnIp as ourselves as the owner
|
|
|
|
// We are the owner because we don't want a lighthouse server to advertise for static hosts it was configured with
|
|
|
|
// And we don't want a lighthouse query reply to interfere with our learned cache if we are a client
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lh *LightHouse) AddStaticRemote(vpnIp iputil.VpnIp, toAddr *udp.Addr) {
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
lh.Lock()
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
am := lh.unlockedGetRemoteList(vpnIp)
|
|
|
|
am.Lock()
|
|
|
|
defer am.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
lh.Unlock()
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if ipv4 := toAddr.IP.To4(); ipv4 != nil {
|
|
|
|
to := NewIp4AndPort(ipv4, uint32(toAddr.Port))
|
2021-10-19 16:54:30 +02:00
|
|
|
if !lh.unlockedShouldAddV4(vpnIp, to) {
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
am.unlockedPrependV4(lh.myVpnIp, to)
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
to := NewIp6AndPort(toAddr.IP, uint32(toAddr.Port))
|
2021-10-19 16:54:30 +02:00
|
|
|
if !lh.unlockedShouldAddV6(vpnIp, to) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
am.unlockedPrependV6(lh.myVpnIp, to)
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Mark it as static
|
|
|
|
lh.staticList[vpnIp] = struct{}{}
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
// unlockedGetRemoteList assumes you have the lh lock
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lh *LightHouse) unlockedGetRemoteList(vpnIp iputil.VpnIp) *RemoteList {
|
|
|
|
am, ok := lh.addrMap[vpnIp]
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
|
|
am = NewRemoteList()
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
lh.addrMap[vpnIp] = am
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
return am
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
// unlockedShouldAddV4 checks if to is allowed by our allow list
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lh *LightHouse) unlockedShouldAddV4(vpnIp iputil.VpnIp, to *Ip4AndPort) bool {
|
|
|
|
allow := lh.remoteAllowList.AllowIpV4(vpnIp, iputil.VpnIp(to.Ip))
|
2021-04-01 17:23:31 +02:00
|
|
|
if lh.l.Level >= logrus.TraceLevel {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
lh.l.WithField("remoteIp", vpnIp).WithField("allow", allow).Trace("remoteAllowList.Allow")
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
2020-04-08 21:36:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if !allow || ipMaskContains(lh.myVpnIp, lh.myVpnZeros, iputil.VpnIp(to.Ip)) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return false
|
Add lighthouse.{remoteAllowList,localAllowList} (#217)
These settings make it possible to blacklist / whitelist IP addresses
that are used for remote connections.
`lighthouse.remoteAllowList` filters which remote IPs are allow when
fetching from the lighthouse (or, if you are the lighthouse, which IPs
you store and forward to querying hosts). By default, any remote IPs are
allowed. You can provide CIDRs here with `true` to allow and `false` to
deny. The most specific CIDR rule applies to each remote. If all rules
are "allow", the default will be "deny", and vice-versa. If both "allow"
and "deny" rules are present, then you MUST set a rule for "0.0.0.0/0"
as the default.
lighthouse:
remoteAllowList:
# Example to block IPs from this subnet from being used for remote IPs.
"172.16.0.0/12": false
# A more complicated example, allow public IPs but only private IPs from a specific subnet
"0.0.0.0/0": true
"10.0.0.0/8": false
"10.42.42.0/24": true
`lighthouse.localAllowList` has the same logic as above, but it applies
to the local addresses we advertise to the lighthouse. Additionally, you
can specify an `interfaces` map of regular expressions to match against
interface names. The regexp must match the entire name. All interface
rules must be either true or false (and the default rule will be the
inverse). CIDR rules are matched after interface name rules.
Default is all local IP addresses.
lighthouse:
localAllowList:
# Example to blacklist docker interfaces.
interfaces:
'docker.*': false
# Example to only advertise IPs in this subnet to the lighthouse.
"10.0.0.0/8": true
2020-04-08 21:36:43 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return true
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
// unlockedShouldAddV6 checks if to is allowed by our allow list
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lh *LightHouse) unlockedShouldAddV6(vpnIp iputil.VpnIp, to *Ip6AndPort) bool {
|
2021-10-19 16:54:30 +02:00
|
|
|
allow := lh.remoteAllowList.AllowIpV6(vpnIp, to.Hi, to.Lo)
|
2021-04-01 17:23:31 +02:00
|
|
|
if lh.l.Level >= logrus.TraceLevel {
|
|
|
|
lh.l.WithField("remoteIp", lhIp6ToIp(to)).WithField("allow", allow).Trace("remoteAllowList.Allow")
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
// We don't check our vpn network here because nebula does not support ipv6 on the inside
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if !allow {
|
|
|
|
return false
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return true
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 17:23:31 +02:00
|
|
|
func lhIp6ToIp(v *Ip6AndPort) net.IP {
|
|
|
|
ip := make(net.IP, 16)
|
|
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(ip[:8], v.Hi)
|
|
|
|
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(ip[8:], v.Lo)
|
|
|
|
return ip
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lh *LightHouse) IsLighthouseIP(vpnIp iputil.VpnIp) bool {
|
|
|
|
if _, ok := lh.lighthouses[vpnIp]; ok {
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
return true
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func NewLhQueryByInt(VpnIp iputil.VpnIp) *NebulaMeta {
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
return &NebulaMeta{
|
|
|
|
Type: NebulaMeta_HostQuery,
|
|
|
|
Details: &NebulaMetaDetails{
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
VpnIp: uint32(VpnIp),
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
func NewIp4AndPort(ip net.IP, port uint32) *Ip4AndPort {
|
|
|
|
ipp := Ip4AndPort{Port: port}
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
ipp.Ip = uint32(iputil.Ip2VpnIp(ip))
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return &ipp
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
func NewIp6AndPort(ip net.IP, port uint32) *Ip6AndPort {
|
2021-04-01 17:23:31 +02:00
|
|
|
return &Ip6AndPort{
|
|
|
|
Hi: binary.BigEndian.Uint64(ip[:8]),
|
|
|
|
Lo: binary.BigEndian.Uint64(ip[8:]),
|
|
|
|
Port: port,
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func NewUDPAddrFromLH4(ipp *Ip4AndPort) *udp.Addr {
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
ip := ipp.Ip
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
return udp.NewAddr(
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
net.IPv4(byte(ip&0xff000000>>24), byte(ip&0x00ff0000>>16), byte(ip&0x0000ff00>>8), byte(ip&0x000000ff)),
|
|
|
|
uint16(ipp.Port),
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func NewUDPAddrFromLH6(ipp *Ip6AndPort) *udp.Addr {
|
|
|
|
return udp.NewAddr(lhIp6ToIp(ipp), uint16(ipp.Port))
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lh *LightHouse) LhUpdateWorker(ctx context.Context, f udp.EncWriter) {
|
2019-12-26 22:12:31 +01:00
|
|
|
if lh.amLighthouse || lh.interval == 0 {
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-02 19:14:26 +01:00
|
|
|
clockSource := time.NewTicker(time.Second * time.Duration(lh.interval))
|
|
|
|
defer clockSource.Stop()
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
for {
|
2021-03-02 02:06:01 +01:00
|
|
|
lh.SendUpdate(f)
|
2021-11-02 19:14:26 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
select {
|
|
|
|
case <-ctx.Done():
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
case <-clockSource.C:
|
|
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-03-02 02:06:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lh *LightHouse) SendUpdate(f udp.EncWriter) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
var v4 []*Ip4AndPort
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
var v6 []*Ip6AndPort
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-03-26 15:46:30 +01:00
|
|
|
for _, e := range *localIps(lh.l, lh.localAllowList) {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if ip4 := e.To4(); ip4 != nil && ipMaskContains(lh.myVpnIp, lh.myVpnZeros, iputil.Ip2VpnIp(ip4)) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
continue
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
// Only add IPs that aren't my VPN/tun IP
|
|
|
|
if ip := e.To4(); ip != nil {
|
|
|
|
v4 = append(v4, NewIp4AndPort(e, lh.nebulaPort))
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
v6 = append(v6, NewIp6AndPort(e, lh.nebulaPort))
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-03-02 02:06:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
m := &NebulaMeta{
|
|
|
|
Type: NebulaMeta_HostUpdateNotification,
|
|
|
|
Details: &NebulaMetaDetails{
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
VpnIp: uint32(lh.myVpnIp),
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
Ip4AndPorts: v4,
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
Ip6AndPorts: v6,
|
2021-03-02 02:06:01 +01:00
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lh.metricTx(NebulaMeta_HostUpdateNotification, int64(len(lh.lighthouses)))
|
|
|
|
nb := make([]byte, 12, 12)
|
|
|
|
out := make([]byte, mtu)
|
2021-04-01 17:23:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mm, err := proto.Marshal(m)
|
2021-04-18 01:47:31 +02:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
2021-04-01 17:23:31 +02:00
|
|
|
lh.l.WithError(err).Error("Error while marshaling for lighthouse update")
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-03-02 02:06:01 +01:00
|
|
|
for vpnIp := range lh.lighthouses {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
f.SendMessageToVpnIp(header.LightHouse, 0, vpnIp, mm, nb, out)
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-11-23 20:50:01 +01:00
|
|
|
type LightHouseHandler struct {
|
|
|
|
lh *LightHouse
|
|
|
|
nb []byte
|
|
|
|
out []byte
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
pb []byte
|
2020-11-23 20:50:01 +01:00
|
|
|
meta *NebulaMeta
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
l *logrus.Logger
|
2020-11-23 20:50:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (lh *LightHouse) NewRequestHandler() *LightHouseHandler {
|
|
|
|
lhh := &LightHouseHandler{
|
|
|
|
lh: lh,
|
|
|
|
nb: make([]byte, 12, 12),
|
|
|
|
out: make([]byte, mtu),
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
l: lh.l,
|
|
|
|
pb: make([]byte, mtu),
|
2020-11-23 20:50:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
meta: &NebulaMeta{
|
|
|
|
Details: &NebulaMetaDetails{},
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return lhh
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
func (lh *LightHouse) metricRx(t NebulaMeta_MessageType, i int64) {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
lh.metrics.Rx(header.MessageType(t), 0, i)
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
func (lh *LightHouse) metricTx(t NebulaMeta_MessageType, i int64) {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
lh.metrics.Tx(header.MessageType(t), 0, i)
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-11-23 20:50:01 +01:00
|
|
|
// This method is similar to Reset(), but it re-uses the pointer structs
|
|
|
|
// so that we don't have to re-allocate them
|
|
|
|
func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) resetMeta() *NebulaMeta {
|
|
|
|
details := lhh.meta.Details
|
|
|
|
lhh.meta.Reset()
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Keep the array memory around
|
|
|
|
details.Ip4AndPorts = details.Ip4AndPorts[:0]
|
|
|
|
details.Ip6AndPorts = details.Ip6AndPorts[:0]
|
2020-11-23 20:50:01 +01:00
|
|
|
lhh.meta.Details = details
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return lhh.meta
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) HandleRequest(rAddr *udp.Addr, vpnIp iputil.VpnIp, p []byte, w udp.EncWriter) {
|
2020-11-23 20:50:01 +01:00
|
|
|
n := lhh.resetMeta()
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
err := n.Unmarshal(p)
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
lhh.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnIp", vpnIp).WithField("udpAddr", rAddr).
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
Error("Failed to unmarshal lighthouse packet")
|
|
|
|
//TODO: send recv_error?
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if n.Details == nil {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
lhh.l.WithField("vpnIp", vpnIp).WithField("udpAddr", rAddr).
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
Error("Invalid lighthouse update")
|
|
|
|
//TODO: send recv_error?
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
lhh.lh.metricRx(n.Type, 1)
|
2020-06-26 19:45:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
switch n.Type {
|
|
|
|
case NebulaMeta_HostQuery:
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
lhh.handleHostQuery(n, vpnIp, rAddr, w)
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
case NebulaMeta_HostQueryReply:
|
|
|
|
lhh.handleHostQueryReply(n, vpnIp)
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
case NebulaMeta_HostUpdateNotification:
|
|
|
|
lhh.handleHostUpdateNotification(n, vpnIp)
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
case NebulaMeta_HostMovedNotification:
|
|
|
|
case NebulaMeta_HostPunchNotification:
|
|
|
|
lhh.handleHostPunchNotification(n, vpnIp, w)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostQuery(n *NebulaMeta, vpnIp iputil.VpnIp, addr *udp.Addr, w udp.EncWriter) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
// Exit if we don't answer queries
|
|
|
|
if !lhh.lh.amLighthouse {
|
|
|
|
if lhh.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
|
|
|
|
lhh.l.Debugln("I don't answer queries, but received from: ", addr)
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
//TODO: we can DRY this further
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
reqVpnIp := n.Details.VpnIp
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
//TODO: Maybe instead of marshalling into n we marshal into a new `r` to not nuke our current request data
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
found, ln, err := lhh.lh.queryAndPrepMessage(iputil.VpnIp(n.Details.VpnIp), func(c *cache) (int, error) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
n = lhh.resetMeta()
|
|
|
|
n.Type = NebulaMeta_HostQueryReply
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
n.Details.VpnIp = reqVpnIp
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
lhh.coalesceAnswers(c, n)
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return n.MarshalTo(lhh.pb)
|
|
|
|
})
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if !found {
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
lhh.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnIp", vpnIp).Error("Failed to marshal lighthouse host query reply")
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
lhh.lh.metricTx(NebulaMeta_HostQueryReply, 1)
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
w.SendMessageToVpnIp(header.LightHouse, 0, vpnIp, lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.nb, lhh.out[:0])
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
// This signals the other side to punch some zero byte udp packets
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
found, ln, err = lhh.lh.queryAndPrepMessage(vpnIp, func(c *cache) (int, error) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
n = lhh.resetMeta()
|
|
|
|
n.Type = NebulaMeta_HostPunchNotification
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
n.Details.VpnIp = uint32(vpnIp)
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
lhh.coalesceAnswers(c, n)
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return n.MarshalTo(lhh.pb)
|
|
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if !found {
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if err != nil {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
lhh.l.WithError(err).WithField("vpnIp", vpnIp).Error("Failed to marshal lighthouse host was queried for")
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lhh.lh.metricTx(NebulaMeta_HostPunchNotification, 1)
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
w.SendMessageToVpnIp(header.LightHouse, 0, iputil.VpnIp(reqVpnIp), lhh.pb[:ln], lhh.nb, lhh.out[:0])
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) coalesceAnswers(c *cache, n *NebulaMeta) {
|
|
|
|
if c.v4 != nil {
|
|
|
|
if c.v4.learned != nil {
|
|
|
|
n.Details.Ip4AndPorts = append(n.Details.Ip4AndPorts, c.v4.learned)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.v4.reported != nil && len(c.v4.reported) > 0 {
|
|
|
|
n.Details.Ip4AndPorts = append(n.Details.Ip4AndPorts, c.v4.reported...)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if c.v6 != nil {
|
|
|
|
if c.v6.learned != nil {
|
|
|
|
n.Details.Ip6AndPorts = append(n.Details.Ip6AndPorts, c.v6.learned)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.v6.reported != nil && len(c.v6.reported) > 0 {
|
|
|
|
n.Details.Ip6AndPorts = append(n.Details.Ip6AndPorts, c.v6.reported...)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostQueryReply(n *NebulaMeta, vpnIp iputil.VpnIp) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if !lhh.lh.IsLighthouseIP(vpnIp) {
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
lhh.lh.Lock()
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
am := lhh.lh.unlockedGetRemoteList(iputil.VpnIp(n.Details.VpnIp))
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
am.Lock()
|
|
|
|
lhh.lh.Unlock()
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
certVpnIp := iputil.VpnIp(n.Details.VpnIp)
|
|
|
|
am.unlockedSetV4(vpnIp, certVpnIp, n.Details.Ip4AndPorts, lhh.lh.unlockedShouldAddV4)
|
|
|
|
am.unlockedSetV6(vpnIp, certVpnIp, n.Details.Ip6AndPorts, lhh.lh.unlockedShouldAddV6)
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
am.Unlock()
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Non-blocking attempt to trigger, skip if it would block
|
|
|
|
select {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
case lhh.lh.handshakeTrigger <- iputil.VpnIp(n.Details.VpnIp):
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostUpdateNotification(n *NebulaMeta, vpnIp iputil.VpnIp) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if !lhh.lh.amLighthouse {
|
|
|
|
if lhh.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
|
|
|
|
lhh.l.Debugln("I am not a lighthouse, do not take host updates: ", vpnIp)
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
//Simple check that the host sent this not someone else
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
if n.Details.VpnIp != uint32(vpnIp) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if lhh.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
lhh.l.WithField("vpnIp", vpnIp).WithField("answer", iputil.VpnIp(n.Details.VpnIp)).Debugln("Host sent invalid update")
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
lhh.lh.Lock()
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
am := lhh.lh.unlockedGetRemoteList(vpnIp)
|
|
|
|
am.Lock()
|
|
|
|
lhh.lh.Unlock()
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
certVpnIp := iputil.VpnIp(n.Details.VpnIp)
|
|
|
|
am.unlockedSetV4(vpnIp, certVpnIp, n.Details.Ip4AndPorts, lhh.lh.unlockedShouldAddV4)
|
|
|
|
am.unlockedSetV6(vpnIp, certVpnIp, n.Details.Ip6AndPorts, lhh.lh.unlockedShouldAddV6)
|
2021-04-14 20:50:09 +02:00
|
|
|
am.Unlock()
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func (lhh *LightHouseHandler) handleHostPunchNotification(n *NebulaMeta, vpnIp iputil.VpnIp, w udp.EncWriter) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if !lhh.lh.IsLighthouseIP(vpnIp) {
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
empty := []byte{0}
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
punch := func(vpnPeer *udp.Addr) {
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
if vpnPeer == nil {
|
|
|
|
return
|
2021-03-19 02:37:24 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
go func() {
|
|
|
|
time.Sleep(lhh.lh.punchDelay)
|
|
|
|
lhh.lh.metricHolepunchTx.Inc(1)
|
|
|
|
lhh.lh.punchConn.WriteTo(empty, vpnPeer)
|
|
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if lhh.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
|
|
|
|
//TODO: lacking the ip we are actually punching on, old: l.Debugf("Punching %s on %d for %s", IntIp(a.Ip), a.Port, IntIp(n.Details.VpnIp))
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
lhh.l.Debugf("Punching on %d for %s", vpnPeer.Port, iputil.VpnIp(n.Details.VpnIp))
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
for _, a := range n.Details.Ip4AndPorts {
|
|
|
|
punch(NewUDPAddrFromLH4(a))
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-06-26 19:45:48 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
for _, a := range n.Details.Ip6AndPorts {
|
|
|
|
punch(NewUDPAddrFromLH6(a))
|
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
// This sends a nebula test packet to the host trying to contact us. In the case
|
|
|
|
// of a double nat or other difficult scenario, this may help establish
|
|
|
|
// a tunnel.
|
|
|
|
if lhh.lh.punchBack {
|
2021-11-04 03:54:27 +01:00
|
|
|
queryVpnIp := iputil.VpnIp(n.Details.VpnIp)
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
go func() {
|
|
|
|
time.Sleep(time.Second * 5)
|
|
|
|
if lhh.l.Level >= logrus.DebugLevel {
|
2021-11-04 03:54:27 +01:00
|
|
|
lhh.l.Debugf("Sending a nebula test packet to vpn ip %s", queryVpnIp)
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//NOTE: we have to allocate a new output buffer here since we are spawning a new goroutine
|
|
|
|
// for each punchBack packet. We should move this into a timerwheel or a single goroutine
|
|
|
|
// managed by a channel.
|
2021-11-04 03:54:27 +01:00
|
|
|
w.SendMessageToVpnIp(header.Test, header.TestRequest, queryVpnIp, []byte(""), make([]byte, 12, 12), make([]byte, mtu))
|
2021-04-01 00:32:02 +02:00
|
|
|
}()
|
2019-11-19 18:00:20 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-01 17:23:31 +02:00
|
|
|
// ipMaskContains checks if testIp is contained by ip after applying a cidr
|
|
|
|
// zeros is 32 - bits from net.IPMask.Size()
|
2021-11-04 02:54:04 +01:00
|
|
|
func ipMaskContains(ip iputil.VpnIp, zeros iputil.VpnIp, testIp iputil.VpnIp) bool {
|
2021-04-01 17:23:31 +02:00
|
|
|
return (testIp^ip)>>zeros == 0
|
|
|
|
}
|